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ABSTRACT
Modern engineering design is a complex, temporal, path dependent process in
which designers generate knowledge for decision-making. Designers do this by uti-
lizing design tools such as optimization or design synthesis tools that generate data
to explore a potential design space. There is a misguided equivalence within the
naval design community that data, information, and knowledge are interchangeable.
It is assumed that design data is a representation of relationships within and between
data, information, and knowledge. Knowledge, which is ultimately the goal, is derived
from the proper combination of information with analysis and experience. Decision
outcomes made based on designer perception of knowledge will not be determined
until the impacts of the decision are realized at a later date.
The critical question addressed in this thesis is “how does one determine the
sufficiency or quality of a design decision based upon design tool generated data
without awareness of future outcomes?” To address this issue, the first realization
is that all design tools are created based upon knowledge artifacts. These artifacts
and their structure predicate the available data that will be used for design decision-
making. Often these tools are modified or extended for use beyond their original
development intent. While design data generating tools are assumed to be generalized
for a wide range of appropriate use, the ability to determine if this is true does not
exist within the literature. One can clearly prove failures in design tool suitability
through traditional convergence statistics and lack of Pareto optimality. The issue lies
in the regions in which solution generation and solution statistics, as well as Pareto
front generation, is deemed successful. However, statistical success does not relate to
x
data suitability for the desired design knowledge generation and query.
Knowledge queries are uniquely human in that, unlike computers, designers have
the ability to follow nonlinear patterns of associations to generate inferences based
on data perception. This puts designers at risk for formulating inferences that may
not be true relative to the underlying statistics associated with how the inference
data was generated. Cognitive biases define the myriad methods in which designers
associate meanings to data in ways that do not directly map the data. While the thesis
contained within does not directly address cognitive biases it provides a mechanism
for the evaluation of design inferences utilizing logical syllogism evaluations of design
space exploration data as the means for the determination of sufficiency of generated
data used for decision-making.
This dissertation presents the development of a novel logic-based syllogistic Bayesian
framework that enables the evaluation of the suitable use of a tool for knowledge de-
velopment or queries. This work utilizes AAA1, AAA2, and AAA3 syllogisms to
represent designer decisions. Syllogisms are transformed into Bayesian networks used
to calculate metrics for evaluation of the data generated by an instance of a tool. A
unique approach to network construction allows for Bayesian probability and mutual
information to examine designer decision-making as syllogisms. Within this work,
several cases will be presented that demonstrate the methodology as well as extend




Modern engineering design is a complex, path dependent process in which knowl-
edge is generated for decision-making through time. Early stage design requires the
growth and development of knowledge structures so that decisions can be made that
lead to design development progression. Decisions with the greatest impact on the fi-
nal design are often made in the earliest design stages where there is the least amount
of design knowledge and the most uncertainty. Significant time and effort has gone
into the development of tools to support the creation of design data used for design
knowledge generation, but little has been done to understand the construction and
implication of conclusions drawn when using automated tool-generated data.
The research presented in this thesis utilizes Design Science, Bayesian networks,
and Logic Theory to create a framework that enables the understanding of the suit-
ability of tool-generated data for use in specific designer inferences whose intent is
decision-making. This leads to general strategies to understand how conclusions and
thus decisions arise from designer knowledge structures populated in part by the use
of data generated by automated design tools. The goal of this framework is to pro-
vide new insights into the suitability of design tool-generated data for decision-making
queries.
1
1.1 Motivation and Background
The growth of knowledge for decision-making in design can be best understood
as the development of the knowledge structure; that is, the establishment of the
relationships between the ideas, concept elements, and evidence behind the product
(Goodrum, 2020). One piece of building design knowledge is through understanding
and formulation of the design problem, often by using tools developed for initial design
solution generation and tradespace development. This is expressed in the cyclical
growth of knowledge structures and product structures. Product structures describe
the constituent connections and interdependent elements which define the product
either physically or virtually. At each stage of the design processes, deliverables are
established which in turn predicate what knowledge must be created to complete the
tasks associated with the deliverable. Once the knowledge structures are formed,
decisions are made to populate the product structures from the knowledge structures
for beginning the next stage of design.
The interplay between knowledge structures and product structures results in the
codification of the path dependencies inherent in knowledge structures (Page, 2006).
These path dependencies are the results of how the ordering in which the design
is approached influences the development of the knowledge structure. Path depen-
dency consequences affect future outcomes of designs in ways such as the shift toward
emergent design failures and inadvertent lock-in (Dong , 2016). These potentially un-
appreciated constraints are inherent to requirements elucidation and are integral to
the consideration of ship design as a wicked problem (Andrews , 2012). Wicked prob-
lems were originally coined by Webber and Rittel (1973) and summarized by Conklin
(2006) as six defining characteristics:
1. The problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution.
2. Design problems have no stopping rule.
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3. Solutions to design problems are not right or wrong but good or bad.
4. Every design problem is essentially novel and unique.
5. Every solution to a design problem is a “one shot operation.”
6. Design problems have no given alternative solutions.
Each of these characteristics apply to the creation of novel ship designs. While
each aspect of the wicked problem is important, it is the belief of the author that the
first tenet, ‘the problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution’,
is the most critical when addressing the issues associated with the assumption that
knowledge query conclusions derived from design tool output are new, novel, and
sufficient. In all problem formulations that are not pure physics representations, the
functions or equations and code structure which represents a state of the developer’s
knowledge structure, is entwined with the product structure represented by the solu-
tions and input-to-output relationships or solution compositions. The actions taken
to solve the wicked problem are analogous to those in the pursuit of understanding its
nature. When wicked problems are attempted to be understood through the lens of a
design tool, the nature of the problem is then defined by the knowledge structure and
knowledge structure interrelationships contained within the tool in conjunction with
the designer’s conclusions drawn through the manipulation of the tool. The question
then arises: how is sufficiency of the designer’s conclusion quantified in terms of the
data generated by a design tool?
Historically the designer’s subjectivity and experience is integral to the determina-
tion of sufficiency allowing for design decisions and design development progression.
For a design decision to be made, the designer must choose some indication by which
they judge the solution as ‘good enough’ or, at a minimum, sufficient given the current
state of design knowledge. Common practices include fulfilling a list of requirements
or numerical thresholds. These conditions originated as a designer’s expert opinion
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and are used by modern designers in concert with their own acumen to subjectively
determine what conditions or circumstances must be reached for a ‘good enough’
solution to end the design activity and move forward in the design process.
Often, designers follow certain standards to mitigate the possibility of emergent
design failures. One such potential consequence is inadvertent design lock-in. Lock-in
refers to the stage in a design at which it becomes extremely difficult, and thus costly,
to substantially change the design path regardless of new information. This is not
necessarily bad, depending on when and where it occurs during the process. Should
the sequence of actions taken to develop the knowledge structure limit the integration
and influence of future events, significant time and money may be expended to return
the design to a stage where it can still be altered appreciably.
In order to mitigate undesired consequences from lock-in or other emergent fail-
ures, one strategy taken by designers is to avoid unnecessary reductions of the solu-
tion set (Singer et al., 2009). By only eliminating options that previous experience
or authorities have determined to not contribute to developing the ending solution
conditions, the possibility of emergent failure can be lessened.
Thus, solutions selected to move forward with are not always the best or optimal
solution. Wicked problems have no “true or false answers ... assessments of proposed
solutions are expressed as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or, more likely, as ‘better or worse’ or
‘satisfying’ or ‘good enough’ ” (Webber and Rittel , 1973). A ‘good enough’ solution
is one that the designer has determined as acceptable once they have developed a
knowledge structure for such decision-making and determined the solution meets the
proscribed requirements.
This notion of ‘good enough’ can be described by the concept of sufficiency. A
sufficient decision is one that the designer declares adequate based on appropriate
knowledge from designer actions and prior experiences. Paradoxically, sufficiency
is informed by the problem formulation. This interdependent relationship between
4
problem definition and solution creation strongly influences the construction of the
knowledge structure for decision-making. Sufficient decisions are made with knowl-
edge influenced by the accessibility and ordering of information the designer seeks out,
but the cyclical nature means that significant back and forth between problem for-
mulation and solution creation occurs until a designer determines enough knowledge
has been accumulated for decision-making.
(Floridi , 2017) describes this process of determining sufficient conditions as “a
past-oriented approach, consistent with causal, genetic, or genealogical forms of rea-
soning that lead to a particular modelling or conceptualization of reality, with the
identification of necessary and (perhaps) jointly sufficient conditions, with investi-
gations about what must have been the case for something else to be the case”.
These investigations are a facet of designers’ attempts to avoid the codification of
adverse path dependencies within the solution. Designers must be conscientious of
design lock-in or other consequences resulting from the development of knowledge
structures.
So how do designers decide when enough knowledge has been accumulated for
determining sufficiency? Good decision-making requires a balance between three
factors: enough knowledge to advance the design cycle forward without prematurely
eliminating potential solutions, avoiding detrimental consequences such as lock in or
emergence as a result of path dependencies, and the indiscriminate infinite spend
of resources on the design cycle. Thus there is a necessity in seeking out sufficient
knowledge rather than complete knowledge in an appropriate way to support decision-
making.
This question is key in fields riddled with uncertainty. To determine sufficiency,
it is crucial that “decision makers identify whether they have enough information to
make a choice” (Dong and Hayes , 2011). In complex design, sufficiency is described
as a ‘you’ll know it when you see it’ trait. Utilization of expert evaluations is the
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industry standard of judging when sufficiency has been reached (Flyvbjerg et al.,
2009), which does not assist in understanding how exactly an expert determines that.
Additionally, design is path dependent in regards to knowledge structures as his-
torical knowledge can influence future outcomes, both positively and negatively. By
not understanding how sufficient decisions come from knowledge, emergent design
failures or lock-in can force a design predication before it is suitable, resulting in
re-work or other temporal or monetarily expensive repercussions.
To prevent these consequences and assist in the determination of sufficiency, many
tools have been developed to aid in the process of knowledge generation. One such
tool on which the US Navy has spent significant resources is the Advanced Ship and
Submarine Evaluation Tool (ASSET). ASSET is the US Navy’s principal concept
design synthesis tool used in early stage design to “provide the bulk of the design data
and analysis for these designs” (NAVSEA, 2012). The US Navy wants to develop tools
for design with a focus on tool packages that can generate knowledge for decision-
making. “The results of these complex analyses must be visualized and packaged in
a way that they are easy to understand by both the design engineers and program
managers such that they can be the basis of a smart, timely decision-making process”
(Kassel et al., 2010). There is a desire for these tools to produce not just results, but
also the understanding behind them in such a way as to mitigate the risk of emergent
design failures. This understanding is essential for knowledge structure development
and the formation of decisions.
The Whole System Trade Analysis (WSTA) tool was developed and applied by
Sandia National Laboratories in partnership with the US Army Program Executive
Office for Ground Combat Systems as “a decision support tool”. WSTA has “visu-
alizations designed to facilitate rapid and complete understanding of the trade-space
to stakeholders and provide drill down capability to supporting rationale” (Edwards
et al., 2015) and is advertised as providing “a holistic framework for modeling and
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understanding [key performance, cost, risk, and growth] tradeoffs.” (Henry et al.,
2016)
There is an expressed need for “a deeper understanding of how these tools are
used and, more importantly, how they can be used ... in support of the decision
analysis process” (Spero et al., 2014). It is evident that there is a link between use of
these tools in acquiring knowledge for decision-making and desiring suitable tool use,
with emphasis on the development of understanding in support of decision-making.
Howard (1977) sums up the prevailing view: “It becomes increasingly important for
a [person] to be able to show people why [they] arrived at a particular decision. It is
also important for them to be able to see what changes in factors surrounding that
decision might have led to a different decision.”
‘Changes in factors’ are often investigated through use of tools’ advertised visu-
alization features such as toggle bars or filtering components. In order to examine
appropriateness of suppositions that the designer considers, they may ask ‘what-if’
questions (eg. ‘What if I look at designs with...’) to increase knowledge robust-
ness for decision-making. These questions are attempts to examine appropriateness
of decisions without committing to a path with potential negative implications and
interdependencies.
The overwhelming amount of countless decisions of varying scale to be made at
every junction in early stage design magnifies this issue. Ferguson (1994) attests that
there are “dozens of small decisions and hundreds of tiny ones that every designer
makes throughout the whole process of engineering design.” The designer is constantly
forming conclusions and testing them with every ‘what-if’ question asked of a tool
during the design process. The way that a designer evaluates subjective suitability
of her use of a tool for certain sets of decisions is not quantitatively examined when
codifying the knowledge structure as a product structure. Attempts to do so are often
the application of the knowledge structure to subjectivity rather than the evaluation
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as seen in the use of utility theory and fuzzy logic.
Utility theory, which originated in economics but has made its way into many
fields where subjective value rankings can be valuable, is one way to encode expert
opinion or create quantitative metrics for preferences that may lack data or infor-
mation (Knight and Singer , 2014). Publications on optimal decision-making under
uncertainty skirt against the issue of subjectivity in decision-making (Bullock and
Logan, 1969). “The imposition of (subjective) values for resolving conflicts leads to
rejecting ‘objective’ optimality and replacing it with the criterion of consistency with
one’s goals and values” (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). Utility theory allows for an
improved understanding of design decisions, seen in how options with higher utilities
correspond to more expert preference for those options. The knowledge structure is
applied as the utility values and weights determined by consulted experts. It lacks
any evaluation of the preferences themselves.
A similar absence of an evaluation of preferences is present in fuzzy logic methods
which also incorporate subjective perspectives. Fuzzy logic is a generalization of stan-
dard logic where instead of designating something as completely True (1) or False (0),
it can possess a degree of truth anywhere between zero and one, inclusive. Fuzzy logic
can use linguistic variables to incorporate human expertise into engineering models
to increase the flexibility of design optimization routines (Brefort , 2018), such as in
the US Navy Intelligent Ship Arrangement (ISA) tool. “The overall objective of the
ISA system development has been to ... assist the arrangements designer to create
effective, rationally-based surface ship arrangements with the maximum amount of
intelligent decision-making support” (Parsons et al., 2008). The ISA is an optimiza-
tion tool that uses fuzzy logic to semiautomatically develop arrangements meeting
criteria specified by the designer. Fuzzy logic allows for the designer’s perspective
of uncertainty to be built into a model instead of entirely relying on post-processing
reasoning. However, these designer perspectives are not critically examined for ap-
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propriateness.
Evaluating designer’s subjective decisions remains elusive within tools designed
to assist knowledge structure creation. Examination of appropriateness of designer
subjective decision-making is instrumental in recognizing which designs are sufficient.
Designers want to know the reasoning behind the decisions they make and attempt
to use tools to investigate why. The industry invests heavily in tools to increase
information to augment knowledge structures for decision-making and mitigate risk
but does not similarly invest in understanding appropriateness of the data generated
by a tool use for decision-making.
Work in the University of Michigan’s Advanced Naval Concepts Research lab ap-
proaches this goal. Shields (2017) proposes a knowledge-centric perspective of design
and uses network analysis to identify a designer’s solution development and decision-
making behaviors to avoid emergent design failures. Goodrum (2020) addresses how
knowledge can be modelled and quantified in a design activity to understand concep-
tual robustness from a knowledge-centric perspective. Sypniewski (2019) investigates
and uncovers design interdependencies as a product of the knowledge structure of the
tools used to create it in order to identify, but not evaluate, suitability.
There is a research gap in evaluating the appropriateness of decision-making de-
rived from tool data. Currently there are limited tools to qualitatively and quantita-
tively describe and understand decisions made from conclusions and their associated
foundational premises. Logic theory can be used to examine and codify conclusions
drawn by designers. In combination with design theory, it can lead to general strate-
gies to understand decision-making from conclusions based on knowledge structures
and provide new insights into how designers understand the formulation of conclusions
to reach sufficiency in tool driven decision-making.
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1.2 Research Scope
The presented work is focused on developing a framework to answer the fundamen-
tal question: “how can designers determine the sufficiency or quality of a design deci-
sion based upon design tool-generated data without awareness of future outcomes?”
Evaluating designer decision-making via structures commonplace in logic theory al-
lows for an innovative and insightful understanding of how designers compose and
understand decisions.
The primary research questions this dissertation wants to address are as follows:
1. How can design inferences be represented to model and analyze designer decision-
making?
2. How can design inferences be quantified and evaluated in the context of designer
decision-making?
3. How can sufficiency for data generated by an instance of a tool be understood
without awareness of future outcomes?
This work provides a mechanism for the evaluation of design inferences utilizing
logical syllogism evaluations of design space exploration data as the means for the
determination of sufficiency of generated data used for decision-making. The following
section outlines how this work will address these questions.
1.3 Dissertation Structure
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into the following chapters that are
organized as follows:
• Chapter II presents background information on logic theory in the context of
engineering design.
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• Chapter III introduces the logic-based syllogistic Bayesian framework and de-
tails the mechanics of syllogism construction, Bayesian methods, and mutual
information needed to address the question of sufficient decision-making for
standard flat and non-standard layered logical structures.
• Chapter IV presents the case study that demonstrates the methodology’s capa-
bility to evaluate decision-making sufficiency.




Logic theory provides a descriptive way to address the construction of conclusions
from knowledge structures for decision-making in early stage design. Logic theory
describes the three main types of logical reasoning instances: deduction, induction,
and abduction. These three instances work together in a retroductive process to
develop a sufficient understanding behind a surprising fact. Retroduction provides a
mechanism to describe engineering design and the cyclical nature between knowledge
structures and product structures during design stages.
2.1 Deduction
Aristotle and his followers are credited with originating traditional logic theory,
which began as deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning was originally defined as
any process of reasoning from one or more premises to reach a conclusion. These
contributions of premises to a conclusion are organized as syllogisms. Syllogisms
are at the core of historic deductive reasoning, where conclusions are determined by
combining existing statements. A classic deductive syllogism example shows this:
(1) if p then q
(2) if q then r
(3) if p then r
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If statements (1) and (2) are True, then statement (3) can be derived.
The deductive syllogism is frequently used in mathematical logical proofs. The
law of syllogism allows for a mathematician to present a series of statements, each
following logically from those previously assumed to be true, to end with what she is
trying to prove (Lazar , 1938). Deduction has a presupposition of truth as it is used
to prove that something must be, hence its prevalence in the field of mathematics. It
must be noted that deduction cannot lead to the discovery of new knowledge as the
conclusion has by definition already been embedded in the premises (Taylor et al.,
2018). In addition to mathematics, deductive reasoning can be defined in the context
of scientific experimentation as ‘top-down’ method of applying a known rule or law to
some observation or data to produce a result (Shepherd and Sutcliffe, 2011). The rule
or law is the first statement, the observation or data is the second, and the conclusion
is the result of these statements.
This can be illustrated with a trivial example of determining where one goes for
dinner. Say you are located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Your dining companion is a
vegetarian. You are already walking down Main Street where you can assume all
restaurants have at least one vegetarian dish. These considerations can be laid out
in a logically deductive syllogism:
Rule: Main Street restaurants have vegetarian options.
Case: You are at a Main Street restaurant.
Conclusion: This restaurant has a vegetarian option.
Deductive reasoning begins with the acknowledgment of the rule that Main Street
restaurants all have vegetarian options. This rule is applied to the specific case that
you are at a restaurant on Main Street. This produces the conclusion (hypothesis)
that the restaurant you are at has a vegetarian option. From this conclusion, you
make the decision that you will eat at this restaurant because it has a vegetarian
dish.
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Deduction is an essential kind of reasoning, but its process is rigid. What if the
vegetarian option available at most Main Street restaurants is only a side salad and
not an actual entree? What if you were not sure that all Main Street restaurants
had at least one vegetarian dish? Other reasoning types were developed to cover the
limitations of deduction. One such type is induction, which can account for situations
that incorporate uncertainty.
2.2 Induction
Induction is a ‘bottom-up’ method of reasoning (Shepherd and Sutcliffe, 2011).
With induction, the reasoner begins with some data or specific case, generalizing or
extrapolating from the case with tests or observations to derive a general rule or law
that is epistemically probable.
An instance of applied inductive reasoning can take place as an extension of the
previous dinner example. You begin with the same observation as last time: you and
your companion are at a Main Street restaurant. You ask and find that the place
you are at does not have vegetarian options that are not a side salad after all. You
extrapolate from this and infer that there are no suitable vegetarian options in the
area. The inductive syllogism associated with this is as follows:
Case: You are at a Main Street restaurant.
Test: This restaurant does not have an appropriate vegetarian option.
Conclusion: It’s likely that no other Main Street restaurants have appropriate
vegetarian options.
From this conclusion, you make the decision to go someplace not on Main Street
for dinner. Despite the different constructions of the syllogisms for the reasoning types
of deduction and induction, neither is necessarily superior to the other. An inductive
syllogism applies a test to a case in order to make a conclusion while a deductive
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syllogism implements a case from a rule to draw a conclusion. Different reasoning
processes to produce a conclusion result in making different decisions. Syllogisms can
codify how premises contribute to a conclusion.
Syllogisms originated from traditional propositional logic which requires that each
statement composing the syllogism have a specific truth value of either True or False.
These values do not imply correctness of the statements but are related to the log-
ical validity of the syllogism’s conclusion. Logical validity is determined only if the
argument takes a form which makes it impossible for the premises to be True and
the conclusion nevertheless to be False. This is distinct from judging the actual truth
value of the premises. Arguments that are logically valid are not required to have
premises that are correct, just considered True by the subjective determination of the
term definitions.
Logical validity is not an indication of syllogism usefulness for decision-making.
Deduction implies a logically valid syllogism while induction does not. Deductive
reasoning provides a logically valid process by which if the premises are true the
conclusion is also true. The deductive syllogism dinner example is a logically valid
construction of a deductive reasoning instance, but does not necessarily imply a cor-
rect conclusion. Deductive reasoning based on a wrong premise may lead to a wrong
conclusion. Induction, even with correct premises, may lead to a wrong conclusion.
Most inductive reasoning instances cannot be logically valid because even if all
premises are known to be True, the conclusion cannot be guaranteed to be True. In-
duction provides a process by which a likely and probable conclusion can be reached,
critical when dealing with uncertainty or the absence of information. Induction yields
a conclusion that may not be assumed logically valid but can still be correct. The
inductive reasoning example has you conclude that since some Main Street restau-
rants do not have appropriate vegetarian options, all Main Street restaurants do not.
The application of the situation of the restaurant you are at to all restaurants occurs
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due to the reasoner’s perspective. You may consider the probability of the events
being related to be high due to previous experience out for dinner in similar circum-
stances. If you thought that the restaurant you were at was not representative of
other Main Street restaurants, you would have drawn a different conclusion than the
one presented as an example.
Inductive reasoning can be looked at as the form of pattern recognition based
on experience and personal knowledge. This generally requires the application of
information that is known or observed (Taylor et al., 2018). The applicability of
induction is limited as it can only provide incomplete support for a general rule. The
finite number of observations available to test a specific hypothesis (such that the
conclusion is being drawn from the support of the the existing knowledge base) means
that should there be evidence that would invalidate the inductive conclusion, the
conclusion would not have been made. Induction can produce superficial conclusions
but cannot get to “the bottom of things,” as Peirce (1967) says. Why were no
appropriate vegetarian options available? What reasoning instance type can be used
to find out?
Certain cases lack baseline knowledge or information to draw conclusions from,
such as the circumstances for new or novel design problems. Should a conclusion be
required outside of an existing schema, inductive reasoning is unable to produce it.
These cases require insight or intuition to be formalized and included in a new form
of logical reasoning.
2.3 Abduction
Charles Peirce was one of the first logicians to tackle the idea of a formal reasoning
instance that codifies intuition. He initially lacked a clear, consistent definition of this
type of reasoning but over the next 30 years, Peirce would come to define the reasoning
instance that includes intuition as abduction.
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Peirce’s original description of abduction is as follows: “In the inquiry, all the
possible significant circumstances of the surprising phenomenon are mustered and
pondered, until a conjecture furnishes some possible Explanation (sic) of it, by which
I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily following from the
circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of the conjecture as premises”
(Peirce, 1967).
This loosely defined formalization of abduction was essentially “inference to the
best explanation” (Sober , 2013). Abduction typically begins with the appearance of
some surprising fact or phenomenon. From these observations, a hypothesis is formed
by the reasoner that offers an explanation of the cause behind this phenomenon. Ab-
duction differs from deduction and induction. Deduction assumes certainty, induction
deals with probability based on data, but abduction works to provide a best guess
approach based on limited information. Generally the abductive reasoning instance
produces a conclusion as a suggested statement to test the hypothesis.
Continuing the dinner example, it may turn out that you were only considering
restaurants that could seat you immediately. Restaurants that were busy and had
wait times were initially ignored by you despite having appropriate vegetarian dinner
entrees. You know that Ann Arbor has a large amount of vegetarians. You have a
hunch that the reason none of those restaurants were available to eat at was because
most groups out to dinner include vegetarians that prefer those restaurants.
Like deduction and induction, abduction can be formalized into a syllogism:
Case: Restaurants available do not have appropriate vegetarian options.
Hypothesis: Vegetarians who go out to dinner eat at places with vegetarian options.
Conclusion: Restaurants with vegetarian options are busy, so the restaurants
available do not have those options.
Concluding that vegetarians are why only restaurants without appropriate vege-
tarian options are available ends the abductive reasoning instance but does not end
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the thought process. The reasoner needs more tests or observations to evaluate and
adjust the hypothesis. Perhaps you decide to interview others who frequent restau-
rants to see if there is information that supports your hunch. Maybe restaurants
that have limited menus (and thus no vegetarian option) have faster table turnover,
resulting in shorter wait time. The conclusion of abduction leaves the reasoner in
wont of more investigation to test and support the conclusion drawn.
Abduction alone lacks substantiation for the inference it provides. It must be
complemented by deduction and induction for substantiation. Abduction can be
considered the logic of discovery supported by deduction and induction as the logics
of proof (Hanson, 1958). In contrast to deduction and induction as application or
generalization of natural laws respectively, abductive reasoning instances are “the
only ones in which after they have been admitted to be just, it still remains to inquire
whether they are advantageous.” (Peirce, 1967)
Abductive reasoning creates a hypothesis from an existing, accessible base of
knowledge. If justification of the hypothesis requires additional data or information to
be found, abduction alone cannot be alone to draw conclusions for decision-making.
Abduction seldom provides a logically valid conclusion. Since abduction is used
to generate possible explanations and hypotheses for incomplete observations or sur-
prising facts early in the diagnostic process, it acts as a precursor to more rigorous
testing of the hypothesis. That testing is provided by induction and deduction. All
three of these instances in concert make up the cycle of retroduction.
2.4 Retroduction
The necessity to justify the abductive hypothesis with additional support prompted
Peirce to revise and extend abduction into the retroductive cycle. Retroduction is a
recursive cycle that includes deduction, induction, and abduction and is composed of
three interrelated stages: “finding relevant variables, linking them in a causal chain,
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and assessing the plausibility of the chain.” (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1987) Retroduc-
tion is a knowledge extending process of drawing logical inferences from data and
information as a cycle of thinking backwards from a surprising observation (Rollier
and Turner , 1994).
Retroduction begins with the apprehension of a surprising fact. From this obser-
vation, abduction occurs as the reasoner works backwards to develop a hunch behind
the surprise. Using deduction and induction, the hunch is then examined and altered
as needed before engendering a hypothesis worthy of rigorous testing. The hypothesis
may require additional analysis or adjustment, often needing more testing or further
acquisition of information for the development of knowledge. The back and forth be-
tween hypothesis articulation and knowledge structure development continues until
the concluding solution is deemed sufficient by the reasoner to understand the why of
the surprising fact. At that point the knowledge structures are encoded into product
structures for future stages of design.
The stopping point of retroduction is the assessment of sufficiency, similar to the
way design activities are concluded in engineering design. Historically, engineering de-
sign assesses sufficiency from the designer’s judgement. Einhorn and Hogarth (1981)
describes this succinctly as “In the final analysis the outputs of optimal models are
evaluated by judgement, i.e. Do we like the outcomes, do we believe the axioms to
be reasonable, and should we be content?”
The recursive nature of retroduction is evident in the retrospective process of
engineering design which entangles formulation of a solution with understanding of the
problem. Therefore this work postulates that engineering design uses a retroductive
cycle to generate the knowledge necessary for decision-making. Traditional use of
design space tools in early stage design exemplify this. Designers generate data from
these tools and use visualization aspects such as toggle bars, lagging indicators, and
more to parse the data for drawing inferences necessary for decision-making. When
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a designer asks ‘what-if’ questions while searching the design solutions space, she is
exploring other circumstances while developing and adjusting hunches for retroductive
reasoning to retroactively build knowledge structures for decision-making.
2.5 Retroductive Engineering Design
To better examine engineering design as a retroductive cycle, retroduction can be
separated into five steps. These steps loosely follow Peirce (1967)’s psuedo-syllogistic
construction:
The surprising fact, C, is observed.
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
The first and second step of inquiry follow closely along the first premise seen
above: the surprising fact, C, is observed. Step one requires some phenomenon is
noticed or arises that gives cause to wonder what may be behind it. Step two is the
formation of an initial hunch. These steps are generally abductive.
The third step regards the engendering of the hypothesis: if A (the hypothesis)
were true, then C (the surprising fact) would follow. The hunch is formalized into a
set of statements that compose a testable hypothesis.
The fourth and fifth step deliberate over what the reasons are to suspect that
A (the hypothesis) is true. This includes the classification, testing, and rigorous
examination of the hypothesis proposed in the third step. The fourth step uses
induction and deduction to test the hypothesis. The fifth step uses those tests to
evaluate sufficiency.
In practice, deduction, induction, and abduction are not proscribed to designated
steps but rather recursively interplay to discover, describe, and test a hypothesis ex-
plaining a surprising fact. The transition between noticing a surprising fact and then
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producing a hunch is abductive, but this abduction is based upon existing knowledge
structures produced by deduction and induction. The engendering of a hypothe-
sis from this hunch requires repeated interactions of abduction with induction and
deduction to adjust, test, and evaluate. Despite the natural amalgamation of the rea-
soning types within the retroductive process, the structure of these steps are useful
to describe engineering design as a retroductive process.
Retroduction begins with the first step: the apprehension of a surprising fact, and
design is no different. “The search for an explanation often begins when we notice
that something is different, unusual, or wrong” (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1987). Peirce
(1967) describes this as: “Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation,
in one or another of the three Universes, as some surprising phenomenon, some ex-
perience which either disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of
expectation.”
The prompting of some phenomena differs according to discipline. A traditional
example of this in scientific experimentation is realizing the orbit of a planet does not
fit mathematical models and then hypothesizing that possibly the orbit is affected
by another planetary body’s gravitational field. The hunch stems from the scientist’s
knowledge of gravity and celestial bodies. The hypothesis is then tested and checked
against other astronomical information.
In contrast to this, engineering design often requires the creation of new informa-
tion rather than the exploration or application of existing information. The proclivity
of designers to ask ‘what-if’ questions in early stage design to generate new analyses
and information for potential designs is reflected in the prominence of tool features
providing visualizations to support those inquiries. The Whole System Trades Anal-
ysis (WSTA) tool is one such tool and describes this interrogative process: “Because
of WSTA’s rich data base of subsystem choices and associated attributes, senior level
stakeholders could ask ‘what if’ questions and explore the systems engineering trade
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space to obtain answers within hours and days rather than weeks and months.” (Ed-
wards et al., 2015)
The second step of retroduction is the intuition of a hunch. A designer’s hunch
can manifest as a ‘what-if’ question. Tools are used to not just generate data but
to assist in investigating these questions, often with visualization techniques. Henry
et al. (2016) acknowledges this as “the [WSTA tool] results engine provides dozens
of different filters and views with which to interrogate the resulting trade space.”
Interrogation of the design space is a hunch forcing the creation of new information
in response to some prompting surprising fact or situation.
Hunches are often apprehensions of the designer’s concern while searching for a
surprising fact. Generally, formulation of a hunch is abductive reasoning as hunches
surface due to intuition of the designer when confronted with a surprising fact or
observation. These observations are neither good nor bad, just unexpected and can
take the form of seeking out a novel design or as unanticipated phenomena. Experi-
enced designers ask ‘what-if’ questions to intuit a hunch and construct a hypothesis
in order to understand the surprising fact.
Step three of retroduction is the engendering of the hypothesis from a hunch.
Peirce (1967) describes this as “by the aid of logical analysis . . . we convert ‘B is
heavy’ into ‘B has weight’.” This stage is the formalization of the hunch into defined
premises within a syllogistic form that can be examined with such abilities possessed
by the reasoner. The process of formulating and defining premise are in themselves
miniature reasoning instances informed by designer perspective and abilities. Peirce
(1967) indicated this as “no doubt by introducing suitable definitions as premisses
(sic) the same result can be reached syllogistically; but that is only because logical
analysis has aided in the formation of those definitions.” Once engendered, the hy-
pothesis is tested as or step four of the retroductive process. From those tests, five
begins evaluates the hypothesis for sufficiency.
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There is significant interaction between the engendering, the testing, and the
evaluation of the hypothesis. Ammon (2017) describes this interplay in design as
“little by little, in hard-won steps and iterative loops, rightness is developed, options
are checked countless times, revised, discarded or improved until, eventually, reli-
able knowledge emerges in a stabilized form which allows for the realization of the
artefact.” The cycle of retroduction requires an iterative refinement to continuously
reshape the understanding of the surprising fact or inquiry that sparked the initial
hunch and begins with that hunch being codified into a formal hypothesis.
Peirce (1967) notes that “retroduction does not afford security. The proposition
must be tested.” Testing of the hypothesis incorporates deduction and induction in
support of sufficiency or the abductive generation of a hunch from a surprising fact.
The hypothesis is defined in a context by the designer such that it can be tested.
Testing often consists of examining data generated by a tool using the same tool’s
capabilities. This often proscribes the context of definitions. If the designer has
generated data of resistance values from regression curve equations, the definition of
‘good’ in context must be predicated on resistance as that is what is available and
accessible for testing purposes.
The testing of the hypothesis can consist of broad exploration of the solution space
or a more targeted drill-down approach in an attempt to find an understanding of the
answers to the “what if” questions asked. A more localised investigation is described
in the context of the WSTA tool and shows how retroduction has an implicit reliance
on expert designer opinion. Henry et al. (2016) describes a typical application of the
WSTA tool for a new design program as one that requires “discussions with subject
matter experts (SMEs)” within “an iterative refinement of the calculations used in the
[functional objectives] based on further discussion with SMEs and data availability
for the [technology options].” The iterative refinement mentioned is the generation
and re-generation of data as the designer adjusts the objectives in pursuit of reaching
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some sufficient explanation to end this cycle of retroduction and advance to the next
design activity.
Once tested, the hypothesis is evaluated for sufficiency. If testing does not prompt
sufficiency the hypothesis is then revised. Revision of the hypothesis can consist of
the inclusion of additional hunches or re-contextualizing the hypothesis for auxiliary
testing. The new hypothesis is then interrogated and the cycle continues until a
hypothesis is deemed sufficient to move on to the next design activity. At this point,
the developed knowledge structures are codified as product structures for the next
stage of design.
Peirce (1967) stated that “If Truth (sic) consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any
actual satisfaction, but must be the satisfaction which would ultimately be found if
the inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and indefeasible issue.” Sufficiency is the truth
in satisfaction of the hypothesis as the understanding behind a surprising fact that
Peirce refers to here and is the eventual point at which the designer has collected
enough evidence in support and can no longer improve her hypothesis. At that
point, she has sufficient explanation and understanding behind the surprising fact
that preempted the cycle of retroduction, and that individual cycle of retroduction
can come to a close.
The evaluation of a hypothesis for sufficiency is consistent with designer’s con-
sideration of data generated by tool use in design activities. Edwards et al. (2015)
emphasises the WSTA tool’s role in ensuring that a designer “finally had access to
sufficient data to make an informed decision.”
The process of retroduction in logic theory is analogous to how designers use tools
to draw conclusions for design decision-making. Therefore, this work uses logical
syllogisms to articulate a novel framework for evaluating the suitable generation and
realization of sufficient design data for decision-making. Details of this framework
are presented in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER III
Syllogistic Bayesian Framework for Evaluating
Sufficiency
A retroductive framework for evaluating the suitable generation and realization
of sufficient design data for decision-making is proposed in this chapter. The frame-
work makes use of syllogisms (Section 3.1.1), Bayesian networks (Section 3.1.2), and
mutual information (Section 3.1.3). Section 3.2 presents how the framework investi-
gates decision sufficiency by evaluating decision statements as syllogisms by Bayesian
networks. There are two possible network representations: a flat syllogistic instance
network and a layered syllogism instance network. Associated metrics are probabilis-
tic distributions and mutual information.
3.1 Background
Decisions are structured as logical syllogisms. These syllogisms are transformed
into networks from which probability distributions and mutual information values are
derived. The background components necessary to understanding the framework are
contained in this section.
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3.1.1 Logical Syllogisms
In order to examine the individual decisions that compose the retroductive de-
sign process, each reasoning instance of deduction, induction, and abduction are
constructed as singular syllogisms. A syllogism is comprised of three statements: a
major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion statement. One syllogism has three
total terms shared between statements. Each statement within the syllogism has two
terms. The term shared between the major premise and the conclusion statement is
the major term or the predicate term. The term shared between the minor premise
and the conclusion is the minor term or the subject term. The term shared by the
major and minor premise is the middle term.
Each statement is associated with a syllogistic mood which modify terms within
the statement to be some strength of affirmative or negative expression. The modifier
that does this is a result of the four syllogistic moods listed in Table 3.1. A traditional
syllogism composed of three statements has three moods as each statement has a
specific mood. U represents the first term in the statement and V represents the
second term.
Mood Statement
A All U are V
E No U are V
I Some U are V
O Some U are not V
Table 3.1: Syllogistic Moods (A,E,I,O)
In addition to a syllogism’s three moods, each syllogism has an associated figure.
Table 3.2 lists the four syllogistic figures as statement term pairs and denotes the
predicate (major) term as ‘P’ , the subject (minor) term as ‘S’ , and the middle term
as ‘M’. Regardless of syllogism figure, the conclusion statement has the subject as the
first term and the predicate as the second term.
A syllogism is described as ‘XYZ-N’ where ‘XYZ’ refers to the three moods se-
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Figure One Figure Two Figure Three Figure Four
Major Premise M-P P-M M-P P-M
Minor Premise S-M S-M M-S M-S
Conclusion All conclusion statements are S-P
Table 3.2: Syllogistic Figures (1-4) by Statement
quentially: ‘X’ describes the mood of the first statement (the major premise), ‘Y’
describes the mood of the second statement (the minor premise), and ‘Z’ describes
the mood of the third statement (the conclusion). ‘N’ describes the syllogism figure.
A example construction of an syllogism described by AAA1 is as follows. All three
statements of AAA1 are in mood A: ‘all U are V’. Terms from syllogistic figure one
are substituted in for the terms U and V. Therefore, AAA1 is:
Major Premise: All M are P
Minor Premise: All S are M
Conclusion: All S are P
AAA1 is one of 256 argument forms, many of which are not useful for actual
reasoning purposes. There are 24 syllogisms with logically valid forms, evenly split
across the four syllogism figures. Of these, 15 are unconditionally valid (listed in
Table 3.3) and 9 are conditionally valid (listed in Table 3.4). The definition of logical
validity for syllogisms is a structure for which there is no premise configuration in
which all are true such that the conclusion statement is False. Conditional validity
requires the existence of some term for the form to be valid.
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4
AAA AEE AII AEE
EAE EAE IAI IAI
AII EIO OAO EIO
EIO AOO EIO
Table 3.3: Unconditionally Valid Syllogisms
AAA1 is an unconditionally logically valid syllogism. However, that does not
guarantee the truth of its conclusion. Should a logically valid syllogism be based upon
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Required condition (must exist):






Table 3.4: Conditionally Valid Syllogisms
False or subjective premises, there is a risk the conclusion may also be False. The
opposite of this also transpires. Syllogisms that are not logically valid can still result in
True conclusions, even when based off of subjective premises. Erroneously confusing
logical validity and actual truth can result in false confidence in this framework’s
value.
Each logical reasoning instance is associated with various syllogistic constructions.
AAA1 is an example of an unconditionally logically valid syllogism construction of de-
duction. Forms with syllogistic figure one are generally deductive reasoning instances.
Other syllogism figures are also associated with specific reasoning types. Forms with
syllogistic figure three are generally inductive reasoning instances. AII3 is an example
of an unconditionally logically valid syllogism construction of induction. Forms with
syllogistic figure two or figure four are generally abductive reasoning instances. IAI4 is
an example of an unconditionally logically valid syllogism construction of abduction.
Table 3.5 shows constructed syllogism statements for each logical reasoning in-
stance.
Deduction (AAA1) Induction (AII3) Abduction (IAI4)
Major Premise all M are P all M are P some P are M
Minor Premise all S are M some M are S all M are S
Conclusion all S are P some S are P some S are P
Table 3.5: Example Syllogisms for Each Reasoning Type
Forms that are not logically valid are still useful to draw conclusions for decision-
making. Many of these non-valid forms are those associated with abduction. The
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classical syllogism for abductive reasoning, AAA2, is not logically valid. (Thompson,
2016)
People tend to be comfortable drawing some conclusion regardless of logical valid-
ity. Unlike computers, designers can entertain contradictory or parallel ideas simulta-
neously. In part this can be traced to how the use of natural language modifiers such
as ‘some’, ‘none’, and ‘all’ are open to semantic interpretations. What constitutes
‘some’ of a term may change depending on how a reasoner considers that idea in
context of another. In order to quantify this, Bayesian networks are used to represent
syllogisms probabilistically. Works that model probabilistic syllogisms treat moods
A and I (‘all’ and ‘some’) and E and O (‘not all’ and ‘some not’) as structurally
the same with differing term definitions affecting the probability distribution for that
form. (Hattori , 2016; Tessler and Goodman, 2014)
3.1.2 Bayesian Networks
This section will highlight essential terminology and concepts of Bayesian networks
for this work. For a comprehensive catalog of network theory, see Newman (2010).
Networks are representations of systems manifesting as a collection of nodes con-
nected by edges. Generally, a node represents some determined unit and an edge
represents a relationship between nodes. These edges can be directed or undirected
depending on the desired network properties.
This work uses Bayesian networks to represent syllogisms because of the associated
directional and probabilistic qualities. Each network is a directed acyclic graph in
which a node corresponds to a variable with states and an edge corresponds to a
directed, conditional dependency of nodal states. Simple examples of how Bayesian
networks are constructed can be found in Jensen and Nielsen (2007).
Bayesian networks are probabilistic graphical representations that use Bayes’ The-
orem (Equation 3.1) for probability computations. Equation 3.1 defines the proba-
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bility of event X occurring given knowledge of event Y , to be equal to the ratio of
the probability of both events X and Y occurring to the probability of event Y .
P (X|Y ) = P (X ∩ Y )
P (Y )
=
P (Y |X) ∗ P (X)
P (Y )
(3.1)
Equation 3.1 is also defined in terms of conditional probability. The notation
P (X|Y ) describes the set of conditional probability distributions, each associated
with nodes in a Bayesian network. These distributions can be presented as conditional
probability tables (CPTs) which contain the statistical distribution of nodal states
within the network. Examining these distributions assists in development of insights
into what and how information can affect decision-making. Note that the conditional
probability is not defined when P (Y ) = 0, resulting in an undefined value when
evidence does not exist.
Syllogisms are transformed into Bayesian networks so as to examine sufficiency.
Bayesian Networks provide a structured way to look at the probabilistic causal rela-
tionships inherent in and between syllogism statements (Pearl , 1988). Each node of
the Bayesian network represents a part or parts of a syllogism. Edges represent the
ordering of decision statements. This work uses two representations of a syllogism as
a Bayesian Network: a flat and a layered network. Defining nodal states is associated
with statement component values and is detailed fully later in this section.
The utilization of semantics requires a discussion on the difference between logical
term values and nodal state values. Two semantically different statements are: ‘I’m
not not hungry’ and ‘I’m hungry.’ These statements are equivalent when represented
in propositional logic as ¬(¬H) = H, where H stands for ‘hungry’. However, a
reasoner knows that the emphasis on the second ‘not’ gives these two statements
different interpretations.
Semantic and propositional logic values also differ on the equivalence of A+B and
B + A. Propositional logic considers addition of terms or premises as a symmetric
30
process, However, knowledge structures are path dependent which gives either A or B
emphasis (Page, 2006). This arises as a concern for differentiations between the minor
and major premises. Syllogisms have an inherent premise and term prioritization
which is not reflected in propositional logic. Ordering matters for premise contribution
to a conclusion. Often a design is disproportionately influenced by early knowledge
incorporation.
Situations similar to this require an adjusted mathematical interpretation during
the transformation between the logical term value and the nodal value so as to not
lose their semantic implications.
Syllogism logic traditionally uses Boolean functions as logical values. This can
divorce statements from significant semantic implications. A designer can classify
information beyond just True or False.
Several novel methods were developed in this work to account for the transforma-
tion of semantic language to the logical value of terms within a syllogism and then
to a probability distribution for a Bayesian network. First, the syllogism term com-
ponent values as relating to nodal values include a state indicating non-relevance in
addition to True and False. Secondly, a method for a layered network was developed
and is presented to account for premise ordering implications.
From the flat and layered networks, probabilities are calculated and presented as
CPTs. Mutual information for both types of networks is also calculated.
Flat Bayesian network
A singular syllogism can be represented as a simple three-node Bayesian network.
Each node represents one statement of the syllogisms. The edges connect the state-
ments following the logical flow of the syllogism’s structure: major premise to minor
premise, major premise to conclusion, and minor premise to conclusion (seen in Fig-
ure 3.1). This network representation is called flat due to the premises represented
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Figure 3.1: Bayesian Network for Flat Syllogism Representation
Nodal state values can be True, False, or not applicable (N/A). The value of
including both a False and N/A state is to account for the preeminence of the first
term within a statement. Semantically, ‘if A, then B’ can have three possible outcomes
for evidence. If A provides a context in which a designer is interested in, then the
statement is True or False depending on if B is True or False. But if A does not do
so, that does not mean the statement is False.
Lack of qualifying evidence (N/A) is not inherently contradictory to a statement
the same way a False state is. By including an N/A nodal state, this work seeks to
incorporate some small amount of uncertainty in nodal value statements appropriate
to their original semantic form, approaching the way a pseudo-fuzzy logic approach
might.
Since each node represents a statement, the process for determining the state for
a node is tied back to the component value of the two syllogism statement parts. A
statement can be constructed into two parts (X0-X1) where X0 is the first term and
X1 is the second, each consisting of the modifier from the syllogism mood and term.
This can be seen using the example statement “if on Main Street, eat at a fun
restaurant”. The first part of the statement (X0) would be ‘Main Street’. The second
part of the statement (X1) would be ‘fun restaurant’. The modifier words are both
positive. Modifier words in partial statement component values are included in case
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of term negation. Nodal state values are assigned based off of component values of
the partial statements X0 and X1 as seen in Table 3.6. component values for partial
statements come from term definitions set by the reasoner.





Table 3.6: Partial Statement Values Relating to Nodal State Values for Flat Network
Nodal values of N/A occur when a component value of False for the first part
of a statement indicates that the information contained within the associated piece
of evidence is not relevant. Say a reasoner is considering the statement used above:
“if on Main Street, eat at a fun restaurant”. The example evidence statement, ‘On
Ashley Street at Fleetwood Diner’, has a first part (X0) component value of False;
Ashley Street is not on Main Street. This piece of evidence is thus non-relevant
information and the nodal value is labelled N/A.
An example of a piece of relevant evidence is ‘On Main Street at the Chop House’.
The primary term is Main Street (X0 value True) so it is considered relevant. The
nodal state is then tied to the component value of the secondary part of the statement
while the first part determines the relevance.
What determines the component value of partial statements is context dependent.
To determine the component value of the secondary statement requires consideration
of what is a ‘fun’ place and how can it be quantified. Obviously, ‘fun’ is context
dependent. Perhaps the reasoner defines ‘fun’ as restaurants that serve alcohol. Since
the Chop House serves alcohol, it has a True component value. Thus, the nodal state
is likewise True.
Context can define ‘fun’ differently. Someone who does not care for drinking may
consider ‘fun’ to be an extensive mocktail list instead.
33
Any quantification of semantics requires a reliance on a definition. ‘Fun’ could
also refer to places that have happy hours or outdoor seating or anything the reasoner
deems fitting and matches their perspective of ‘fun’. However, term definition is also
tied to availability of information. For example, if the reasoner doesn’t know what
restaurants have happy hours, then that cannot be used to define ‘fun.’
Layered Bayesian network
Flat networks and their associated probability distribution and mutual informa-
tion values allow for evaluation of a syllogism with a clear prioritization of the major
premise over the minor premise. However, flat networks lack understanding of intra-
premise relationships. A layered approach was developed in order to examine context
to context relationships.
This approach removes the subjectivity of the designer determining what is the
major and minor premise. Within logic theory, there are no mechanisms to determine
what is what within the syllogism structure. Often, the determination of what is the
major premise and what is the minor is speculation or conjecture. If the reasoner
were to select inappropriately, it can result in confusion. The designer can really can
only determine what is of interest, which is represented in the selection of the terms
within the syllogism.
The layered network utilizes a premise node that is comprised of the major and
minor premise instances. This singular node’s value is based on the mechanisms on
which syllogisms work: the terms that make up the syllogism statements. In this
approach, the syllogism terms make up a singular node that represents the premises
within a syllogism.
Edges between nodes show the flow of information from the combined premise
statements to the conclusion statement. Multiple grouped premise statements can
contribute to a single conclusion. These grouped premises have a subhierarchical
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order. For convenience, statements included in this node are described as a major
premise and a minor premise. Figure 3.2 shows the layered network.
Figure 3.2: Bayesian Network for Layered Syllogism Representation
Similar to the flat Bayesian network, nodal states of the layered network have
possible values of True, False, or N/A. Relevancy for the flat network is determined
by the first term of the statement since the nodes represent singular statements.
For the layered network, relevancy is determined by the middle term. The middle
term connects the major and minor premises. Within the combined premises node
it sets the context of the relationship necessary for decision-making. This context
must exist; that is, the middle term has a value of True. If the middle term has a
value of False, that indicates that the lack of connection between the two premises
prevents the evidence’s use in decision-making. The connection between premises is
determined by a True value that indicates the reasoner’s belief in the term and thus
association of the premises. Premises with a True nodal states are not indicative of
actual correctness but rather an affirmation of the designer’s construction of those
premises definitions.
Unlike the flat network, the layered network represents reasoning instances asso-
ciated with syllogism figures with distinct translations of statement term values to
nodal states. Table 3.7 shows a archetypal syllogism defining each term and position
within the three syllogism statements.
Pi refers to the two terms of the major premise: the predicate term and the middle
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term. The subscript refers to the position as either the first term (P0) or the second
(P1). Si refers to the two terms of the minor premise: the subject term and the middle
term. Which terms are the middle term depends on the syllogism figure.
Major Premise: P0 - P1
Minor Premise: S0 - S1
Conclusion: S - P
Table 3.7: Archetypal Syllogism Term Definition
Table 3.8 defines terms for each syllogism figure. Deduction, induction, and ab-
duction can all be represented within this format by different definitions of Pi=0,1,
Si=0,1, and M as the predicate, subject, and middle terms respectively. Recall that
syllogism figure one is deduction, syllogism figure three is induction, and syllogism
figures two and four are abduction.
Term Figure One Figure Two Figure Three Figure Four
Predicate P1 P0 P1 P0
Subject S0 S0 S1 S1
Middle P0, S1 P1, S1 P0, S0 P1, S0
Table 3.8: Syllogistic Figures (1-4) by Term
Nodal state value tables for syllogism figures one, two, and three are seen in Table
3.9, Table 3.10, and Table 3.11 (deduction, induction, and abduction respectively).
Bolded nodal values vary between reasoning types depending on ordering of the pred-
icate and subject within the major and minor premises for reasoning types. Term
component values are True or False and nodal states for the layered network can be
True, False, or not relevant (N/A), same as the flat network nodal values.
The assignment of nodal values for deduction, induction, and abduction are identi-
cal except for the bolded situations. As mentioned previously, when the middle term
is False, the premise connection is not relevant and thus the nodal status is N/A.
When the middle term is True, the combined premises are relevant. In this circum-
stance, if the predicate and subject terms are both the same component value (True
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M (P0 = S1) Value P1 Value S0 Value Nodal Value
T T T T
T T F F
T F T T
T F F F
F T T N/A
F T F N/A
F F T N/A
F F F N/A
Table 3.9: Syllogism Figure One (Deduction) Values Relating to Nodal State Values
for Layered Network
M (P0 = S0) Value P1 Value S1 Value Nodal Value
T T T T
T T F T
T F T F
T F F F
F T T N/A
F T F N/A
F F T N/A
F F F N/A
Table 3.10: Syllogism Figure Three (Induction) Values Relating to Nodal State Values
for Layered Network
or False), the nodal value corresponds to the same value as the predicate and subject.
Reasoning type affects the determination of the nodal value when the predicate and
subject disagree.
The major premise consists of the predicate term and the middle term. The first
term of a statement is the context driving term. When the first term of the major
premise is the predicate (P0) with a False component value, the nodal state is likewise
False. This holds for abductive syllogisms where the predicate is the first term in
the major premise. Context is especially important in abduction which attempts to
provide insight from circumstances into statements. Falseness here means a lack of
context and thus flawed decision-making.
Deduction and induction have the predicate term as the second part of the major
premise (P1). When the predicate has a False component value and is the second
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M (P1 = S1) Value P0 Value S0 Value Nodal Value
T T T T
T T F F
T F T F
T F F F
F T T N/A
F T F N/A
F F T N/A
F F F N/A
Table 3.11: Syllogism Figure Two (Abduction) Values Relating to Nodal State Values
for Layered Network
term in the major premise, the nodal state is tied to the subject component value
and position in the minor premise. When the subject term is also False, the nodal
state is False. When the subject term’s component value is True, the nodal state
depends on the location of the subject term in the minor premise. When the subject
is the first term (S0) as in deductive reasoning, the nodal state is True. The subject
as the first term of the minor premise (S0) drives context more than the predicate as
the second term of the major premise (P1), and thus the nodal state is True to match
the subject. In inductive reasoning, the subject of the minor premise is the second
term (S1) so the nodal state is False to follow the component value of the predicate.
This is to express that the major premise is assumed to be more of a context driver
than the subject in the minor premise.
Regardless of the position of the predicate term in the major premise, when the
predicate has a True component value, the nodal state depends on the subject term’s
component value and position. If the subject is also True, then the nodal state is
True. If the subject is False, then the nodal state depends on the location of the
subject term in the minor premise.
In deductive and abductive reasoning, the subject is the first term of the minor
premise (S0). When the subject is False, the nodal state is False. The first term of
the minor premise drives context more than the predicate as the second term (P1),
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and thus the nodal state is False to match the subject.
In inductive reasoning, both the predicate and subject are second terms in the
major and minor premises (P1, S1). When the subject is False and the predicate is
True, the nodal state is True, following the component value of the predicate.
As mentioned previously, syllogisms structured as figure four are abductive rea-
soning instances. These figures are not included in this framework due to their cyclic
nature and the difficulty of representing that as a directed network. The syllogism
structure of figure four is such that the term determination is dependent entirely on
syllogism statement ordering. Table 3.12 shows three examples of figure four syllo-




Table 3.12: Syllogism Figure Four Examples
Presumption of premise ordering would determine nodal values without context
due to the several possible configurations. A, B, or C could all be the middle term
and determine relevancy.
In order to eventually adjust this framework to include figure four as a syllogistic
representation of abduction, nodal states would need to be expanded to adjust to the
loose context and conditionality inherent in figure four’s syllogism structures.
3.1.3 Mutual Information
Decision-making requires an assumption of connection between premises and con-
clusions. Often there are hidden interdependencies or other biasing within these
statements. In order to quantify and evaluate these relationships, mutual informa-
tion is derived.
Mutual information measures the information that events can share. It is a di-
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mensionless quantity with defined units of nats (the natural unit of information) and
can be thought of as the reduction in uncertainty about one event given knowledge of
another. A designer seeks to mitigate risk by reducing uncertainty, and so this metric
allows for a quantifiable reduction in risk to be compared depending on construction
of a decision.
Mutual information is intimately tied to entropy, the disorder of a system. This
work uses mutual information instead of entropy as mutual information more easily
is calculated from generated probability distributions. Different methods to represent
syllogisms may prefer different metrics.
Mutual information between two jointly discrete random variables, X and Y , is
defined by Equation 3.2, where p(x, y) is the joint probability mass function of X and










Mutual information, I(X;Y ), is a measure of the inherent dependence expressed
in the joint distribution of X and Y relative to the marginal distribution of X and
Y under the assumption of independence. Mathematically, mutual information is a
measure of how the joint distribution of two random variables deviates from the case
where they are independent of each other. Mutual information therefore measures
dependence in the following sense: I(X;Y ) = 0 if and only if X and Y are inde-
pendent. For any amount of dependence, I(X;Y ) is non-zero. I(X;Y ) cannot be
negative.
Mutual information among three variables is called the interaction information
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Equation 3.4 shows interaction information, I(X;Y ;Z), presented in the form of
mutual information, I(X;Y ), and conditional mutual information, I(X;Y |Z). Con-
ditional mutual information is the expected value of the mutual information of two
random variables (X and Y ) given a third (Z).
I(X;Y ;Z) = I(X;Y )− I(X;Y |Z) (3.4)
I(X;Y ;Z) measures the influence of a variable Z on the amount of information
shared between X and Y . When the interaction information is negative, it indicates
that I(X;Y |Z) is larger than I(X;Y ). This will happen when X and Y are inde-
pendent but not conditionally independent given Z. I(X;Y ;Z) > 0 indicates that
Z inhibits (i.e., accounts for or explains some of) the correlation between X and Y ,
whereas I(X;Y ;Z) < 0 indicates that variable Z facilitates or enhances the corre-
lation. Negative interaction information is called synergy, indicating that variables
taken together are more informative than when they are taken separately (Schneid-
man et al., 2003).
Mutual information is symmetric; that is I(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X). This is also true for
interaction information: I(X;Y ;Z) = I(Y ;Z;X) = I(Z;X;Y ), etc. This means that
the mutual information value is identical no matter which variable it is conditioned
on.
The symmetry of mutual information leads to a desire for another way to un-
derstand the combined affect of major and minor premises on the conclusion nodal
status.
There is not a goal or a threshold mutual information value to indicate sufficiency.
Like the way designers make decisions, cases are compared and evaluated depending
on specific circumstances of the knowledge development or queries articulated and
quantified as these values in comparison to other syllogisms examined. Interpretation
of mutual information in the context of the case is presented in Chapter IV.
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Flat Network Mutual Information
The flat network structure includes separate nodes for the three syllogism state-
ments: the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclusion. Interaction in-
formation, as seen in Equation 3.3, is used to calculate the flat mutual information.
Interpretation of I(X;Y ;Z) is below:
I(X;Y ;Z) = 0 : All statements are independent
I(X;Y ;Z) > 0 : One of the statements accounts for some of the relationship
between the other two.
I(X;Y ;Z) < 0 : One of the statements magnifies the relationship between the
other two.
Layered Network Mutual Information
The layered network structures a combined premise node out of the major and
minor premises. Equation 3.2 is used to calculate the mutual information, called
layered mutual information: I(XY ;Z).
Interpretation of I(XY ;Z) is below:
I(XY ;Z) = 0 : The combined premises and the conclusion are independent.
I(XY ;Z) > 0 : Premises and conclusions are correlated and thus potentially
better for decision-making.
I(XY ;Z) < 0 : Premises and conclusions have large amounts of non-relevant
evidence. Connection between premises and conclusions is unclear and cannot be
determined for decision-making.
3.2 Evaluating Decision Sufficiency
Retroduction in engineering design can be structured as seen in Figure 3.3. This




Hunch Hypothesis Test Sufficient? EndYes
No
Figure 3.3: The Retroductive Process as a Series of Steps
In order to evaluate the decision sufficiency, first a tool must be used to generate
data for knowledge development. The Sen bulk carrier code (Appendix A) is one
such tool. Tools such as this one are often considered suitable for a wide range of
use without critical examination of the generated data for decision-making. This
framework allows for the evaluation of design inferences by utilizing logical syllogism
constructions of design space exploration data as the means for the determination of
sufficiency of generated data used for decision-making.
Step 1: Apprehension of a surprising fact
Experienced designers pose ‘what-if’ questions to seek out surprising facts in an-
ticipation of discovering some novel aspect. These ‘what-if’ questions interrogate the
data sets generated by the tool to develop the initial knowledge structures. The ap-
prehension of a surprising fact can arise from any notification or notice of something
that stands out in relationship to a design activity. For this framework, that requires
the creation of evidence as a codification of the knowledge structure.
Table 3.13 is an example of a selection of evidence from a modified Genetic Al-
gorithm (GA) developed based on the Sen bulk carrier code. Each row is a run for
a specific tournament size, with associated numbers of solutions. ‘PF ever’ and ‘PF
final’ refer to the number of solutions generated during a run of the GA ever on the
Pareto front and the number of solutions on the Pareto front at the final epoch for a
run of the GA.
Generation and initial perusal of this evidence prompts the designer to begin the
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tournament sizes total solns feasible solns PF ever solns PF final solns
2 815 742 35 7
3 830 721 33 9
5 862 609 62 15
Table 3.13: Example Evidence from Sen Bulk Carrier Code
formation of certain understandings that may eventually solidify into premises for
decision-making. This begins step 2, the intuition of a hunch.
Step 2: Intuition of a hunch
From the initial examination of tool-generated data sets, an intuition of a hunch
arises. Abductive connections are made into the ‘why’ of the surprising observations
in the form of answers to a ‘what-if’ question. A designer may ask several ‘what-if’
questions in pursuit of answers as to the ‘why’ behind the surprising fact.
The conceptualization of a hunch requires the selection of concepts or areas that
the designer can form terms to construct syllogisms from. A designer using the Sen
bulk carrier tool may begin thinking about quality of solutions generated by the
optimizer.
Step 3: Engendering of the hypothesis
Once a hunch arises, it must be constructed in a testable way. This requires a
formalization of the hunch into a hypothesis. Concepts of interest that were associated
with the hunch in step 2 are rigorously defined as terms such that they are testable.
For example, a designer whose hunch is associated with the quality of the Sen
bulk carrier optimizer may add nuance to the concept of quality. How can quality
be defined? She may consider quality to be the number of solutions who at any time
were located on the Pareto front. She could also define it in other ways such as in
terms of feasible solutions, Pareto front final solutions, or total solutions. All of these
potential definitions are dependent on what ‘what-if’ question and hunch the designer
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is considering.
Data must be organized or quantified the same way as the syllogism statements
are. In design, this happens organically as a designer matches her motivations and
perspective of ambiguous statements such as ‘enough’ or ‘good’ solutions to arbitrary
quantitative delineations for statement definitions. Definitions depend on designer’s
semantic understanding of the language used within the syllogism statements to trans-
late qualitative into quantitative evidence.
Defined terms are arranged into a hypothesis that is constructed as a syllogism.
The syllogism can be constructed several ways depending on the designer’s hypothesis
and perspective. Details on how syllogisms are constructed are in Section 3.1.1.
Step 4: Testing of the hypothesis
To gain insight into the sufficiency of the generated data sets for decision-making,
the relationships between the syllogism statements must be examined. From the
syllogism or syllogisms formed in step three, a flat and a layered network are con-
structed. Networks provide a structure that can determine dependence among nodal
representations. A network is case-dependent and can represent a singular syllogism
engendered from a hypothesis or multiple syllogisms from the multiple hypotheses ex-
amined during the retroductive cycle. Section 3.1.2 details how the Bayesian networks
are generated.
Probabilities and mutual information values are calculated from both flat and
layered networks. To produce the probability distributions, each syllogism statement
has already been defined in context of the evidence that will be used to populate
the networks. These calculated probabilities will be used to calculate the mutual
information values as seen in Section 3.1.3.
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Step 5: Evaluation of sufficiency
Relationships between syllogism statements contributing to a conclusion for decision-
making are examined for insights into sufficiency of generated data.
Sufficiency of generated data used for decision-making is evaluated by calculating
and comparing the quantified values of probabilities and mutual information for flat
and layered network syllogism representations.
Probability distributions allow for an examination of the strength of statements
relationships. Drawing a conclusion requires premises to impact one another. These
distributions show overlap between statements.
Mutual information measures how much a variable can inform about another
variable. Knowing the reduction in uncertainty a statement can bring can mitigate
risk in decision-making.
Certain syllogism statements proposed in the hypothesis are tested in a compara-
tive manner to quantify their conditional dependencies and reduction in uncertainty
on each other.
Sufficiency of generated data for decision-making depends on the strength and
type of syllogism statement relationships. Should the evaluated metrics not indicate a
suitable hypothesis, the third step is returned to and the hypothesis is re-engendered.
Statement and term definitions may also be revised to take into account new knowl-
edge developed during the retroductive process. Then the fourth and fifth steps are
repeated, with the new hypothesis tested and then evaluated for sufficiency. Hypoth-
esis formulation, testing, and evaluation can be repeated multiple times as needed
until the designer is satisfied and confident in her sufficiency judgement.
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CHAPTER IV
Decision Sufficiency Case Study
A representative case study was developed to demonstrate the application of the
retroductive decision-making framework. The case exemplifies the retroductive pro-
cess initiated by a designer asking ‘what-if’ questions during an early stage design
activity.
To show the application of the framework described in Chapter III, this chapter
will examine several subjects that affect the suitability of tool-generated data for
decision sufficiency:
1. Comparison of flat and layered constructions.
2. Implications of the use of deductive, inductive, and abductive syllogisms.
3. Assignment of terms for hypotheses.
An overview of the case’s retroductive process is described in Section 4.1. Veri-
fication and validation of the tool-generated datasets used for reasoning is delivered
in Section 4.2. The syllogisms and associated terms constructed and defined are in
Section 4.3. The results of applying the syllogistic and network methodology to the
case are presented in Section 4.4. Sufficiency is discussed in context of the case in
Section 4.5. Case conclusions are presented in Section 4.6.
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4.1 Story
A designer has been tasked with determining preliminary dimensions for a bulk
carrier in early stage design. The tool available for this task is an optimizer based
on the Sen bulk carrier code. She knows that the optimizer is based off of poorly-
documented code historically used to generate bulk carrier designs. She has concerns
that she may use the tool in such a manner as to generate data unsuitable for drawing
inferences for knowledge generation and decision-making.
Her concerns stem from knowing that the original code has certain component
values based on regression equations. The optimizer she is using produces dimension
values to the millionth decimal place. She thinks that because of this over-precision,
she may be able to truncate certain aspects of the code to speed up run time, without
compromising the quality of the generated solution data or knowledge generated from
use of this tool for decision-making.
Is the data generated by her tool use suitable for decision-making? Will it allow
for drawing sufficient conclusions? The framework detailed in Chapter III allows the
designer to evaluate suitability and sufficiency. This section will detail her methods
and motivations in the context of the retroductive decision-making process to show
how she determines this. Specifics as to the use of the tool are detailed in Section
4.2.
Step 1: Apprehension of a surprising fact
The designer wants to know if generated solution data produced by the optimizer
is useful should she truncate the code for the optimizer. In order to develop knowl-
edge structures for future decision-making, she needs to understand the relationship
between truncation and quality of solutions. The designer does not want to draw
conclusions for decision-making off of non-suitable design data.
Her question of ‘what-if’ she truncates the code is prompted from the surprising
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fact of the overly precise dimensions of the unmodified code. The observation that
the dimension values are precise to the millionth decimal place is surprising to her as
she believes that the shipyards that will eventually build the design she is developing
will not be working to a length dimension that specific. She also suspects that the
regression equation the code was based off of did not have the same degree of precision
as the new optimizer.
These observations of the unnecessarily precise dimensions in congruence with the
designer’s desire to truncate code aspects compels designer consideration. She wishes
to understand if solution data generated by the tool when truncated would allow her
to form conclusions for decision-making.
Step 2: Intuition of a hunch
Despite the designer’s concerns, she hopes that truncating certain optimizer as-
pects will still generate solution data useful for decision-making. Her hunch is that
the type of truncation will affect the quality of the solution data in regards to a re-
duction of diversity or the quantity of unique solutions. Thus, she wants to examine
different types of truncation in order to make an informed choice for what generated
data is suitable to use.
The designer is concerned that there may be unobserved dependencies or holdovers
from older versions of this optimizer code that will affect generated solution data. She
specifically wants to make sure that a truncation code can produce enough solutions
of a certain quality for her to acquire representative knowledge.
Step 3: Engendering of the hypothesis
In order to test and evaluate the designer’s hunch that different types of truncation
may change the relative quality and quantity of solutions from the optimizer, terms
must be defined and formalized as syllogisms. The selection of these terms arises
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from the designer’s thought process described in steps one and two. In summary, the
designer wants to truncate values within the optimizer. Her concerns about quality
and quantity of solutions suggests the following terms to be defined and examined:
‘more truncation’, ‘useful optimizer’, tied to her perception of quality, and ‘enough
solutions’, tied to her perception of quantity.
She is primarily concerned about the production of enough solutions.
How the designer defines ‘useful optimizer’, ‘more truncation’, or ‘enough solu-
tions’ impacts the evaluation of tool appropriateness and conclusion sufficiency. Each
term is quantitatively defined in the context of the generated data that is used for
testing and analysis.
There are 18 possible syllogisms that can be engendered from these three terms.
Section 4.3 describes the syllogism constructions relevant to the designer’s purpose
and how their definitions were developed for this case.
Step 4: Testing of the hypothesis
From the syllogisms and associated term definitions developed in step three, net-
works are created and populated by evidence to produce probability distributions
and mutual information values. Both flat and layered networks and their associated
metrics are created for each syllogism. For this case study, the designer runs the op-
timizer to generate a large solution space populated with potential solutions created
with varying types of truncation.
Evidence to produce the probability distribution and mutual information metric
values for nodes in the Bayesian network are the runs described within the datasets
in Section 4.2.
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Step 5: Evaluation of sufficiency
Once the syllogism networks have evaluated the probabilities and mutual infor-
mation values, the designer must evaluate the hypothesis for sufficiency of generated
data for decision-making. The tested syllogism metrics allow for a quantification of
designer subjective perspective.
Depending on the evaluation, the conclusion may be sufficient for decision-making
and understanding of design tool-generated data suitability. Or, stage three is re-
turned to for a revised hypothesis and repeated testing for additional evaluation.
Sufficiency is context dependent. This framework enables the evaluation of design
inferences utilizing logical syllogism constructions based off of designer perspective of
design space exploration data. The designer can determine sufficiency of the generated
data used for knowledge queries.
4.2 Dataset Generation and Validation
This section details certain assumptions required to create and test the network
syllogism representations. The optimization code, data generation, and validation
are discussed to provide objective comparisons with case results.
Datasets used for the networks were generated from the modified Genetic Algo-
rithm (GA) that Sypniewski (2019) created of the bulk carrier synthesis model from
Sen and Yang (1998) (detailed in Appendix A).
To create each dataset, the modified GA was run with default parameters as
detailed in Sypniewski (2019) for the baseline objective function and tournament
size of 2. The model was run without truncation and with seven combinations of
truncation categories (Table 4.1), creating eight datasets. Each dataset consists of
many runs with differing decimal truncations rounding the designated component
values to 1, 2, 3 and 4 decimal digits.
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For labelling purposes, ‘Input’ truncation refers to truncating ship dimension val-
ues when calculated within the GA. ‘Penalty’ refers to truncating the penalty function
when calculated. ‘Constraint’ refers to truncating the bulk carrier constraint equa-
tions. For notation, if the truncation category is labelled ‘Input’, it should be assumed








Input, Penalty, and Constraint
Table 4.1: Truncation Categories for Evidence Generation
All data and meta data from individual runs were saved to files. Table 4.2 lists
saved variables and associated descriptions. A run consists of many solutions. Types
of solution variables within a run are as follows: solution ID, penalty, feasible status,
epoch start, epoch end, Pareto front epoch start, Pareto front epoch end, Pareto
front ever, Pareto front end, length, beam, draft, depth, speed, block coefficient,
transportation cost, lightship mass, annual cargo, generation total runs, generation
tournament size, generation population size, generation stopping epoch, generation
identification, crossover type, crossover probability parameter, crossover alpha pa-
rameter, run number, parent 1 ID, and parent 2 ID. For in depth descriptions of how
these variables are calculated, refer to Sypniewski (2019).
Any data or information from the optimizer can be used to quantitatively define
syllogism terms. Evidence of interest for this case is listed in Table 4.3.
‘Run ID’ is the overall identification number or runs within truncation category
datasets. ‘Seed’ is the number used to initiate the random number generator so
runs can be compared for the same initializations. Truncation category refers to
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Number of ... Solutions Total, Feasible, Pareto-ever, Pareto-final
Cardinality
Feasible Cumulative, Feasible Not Cumulative,
Pareto Cumulative, Pareto Not Cumulative
Generational Distance Superfront Value, Convergence
Distance from Superfront Feasible, Pareto
Distance to Superfront Feasible, Pareto
Table 4.2: List of Data and Metadata Recorded for Each Run of the Model
Run ID Seed Truncation Category Decimal Truncation Total Soln Feasible Soln PF Final Soln
27 3 all3 truncated 1 826 696 11
10305 25 penalty truncated 4 813 556 95
Table 4.3: Example Values for Evidence
those listed in Table 4.1. Decimal truncation is the number of decimal places the
truncation categories are truncated to. ‘Total Soln’, ‘Feasible Soln’, and ‘PF Final
Soln’ each respectively refer to the number of total number of solutions generated
during the run, number of feasible solutions within a run, and number of solutions
on the final Pareto front at the end of the run.
To validate truncated datsets with each other and with unaltered datasets, the
average distances to and from the superfront of the Pareto set are calculated and
compared. The unaltered dataset cannot form a syllogism and be evaluated with
other case metrics. Therefore in order to have a measure of comparison with an
unaltered dataset, alternative methods must be used.
A superfront is the Pareto set of Pareto sets. It contains the overall dominate
solutions from all runs generated for all datasets, truncated or not. Equations 4.1 and
4.2 state the formulas for distance to the superfront, DT (A), and from the superfront,
DF (A), respectively. A is the solution set and SF is the superfront set. Sypniewski


















Table 4.4 lists the calculated average distance to the superfront for each suite of
runs generated for a decimal truncation and category. Large average distances of
datasets to the superfront indicate optimal solutions of that dataset are worse than
those with smaller distances.
Truncation Categories Digits Truncated Distance To Superfront (Pareto) Scaled (%)
No Truncation X 0.02412 0
Penalty, Constraint 3 0.02467 0.55
Constraint 4 0.02474 0.61
Input, Constraint 4 0.02525 1.11
Constraint 2 0.02552 1.38
Penalty, Constraint 4 0.02568 1.53
Input, Penalty 4 0.02569 1.54
Input 4 0.02595 1.8
Penalty 4 0.02624 2.08
Constraint 3 0.02649 2.32
Input, Penalty, Constraint 3 0.02662 2.45
Input, Penalty, Constraint 4 0.02676 2.59
Input, Constraint 3 0.02693 2.75
Penalty 2 0.02705 2.87
Penalty, Constraint 2 0.02706 2.88
Penalty 3 0.0276 3.42
Input, Penalty 3 0.02771 3.52
Input 3 0.02975 5.52
Penalty 1 0.0314 7.13
Constraint 1 0.0319 7.62
Penalty, Constraint 1 0.03342 9.11
Input 2 0.03641 12.03
Input, Penalty, Constraint 2 0.03976 15.32
Input, Constraint 2 0.04012 15.67
Input, Penalty 2 0.04037 15.91
Input, Penalty, Constraint 1 0.1166 90.55
Input 1 0.12143 95.27
Input, Constraint 1 0.12616 99.9
Input, Penalty 1 0.12626 100
Table 4.4: Average Distance To Superfront (Pareto) for All Datasets
Table 4.5 lists the calculated average distance from the superfront for each suite
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of runs generated for a decimal truncation and category. Larger average distances
of datasets from the superfront indicates a worse optimality of the solutions of that
dataset as well as less solution diversity. The smaller the distance, the better a dataset
is with less homogeneous solutions.
The average distances to and from the superfront allow for a comparative ex-
amination of the quality of optimizer solutions as defined in relation to Pareto-set
solutions when truncated as such. It does not allow for determination of sufficiency
or incorporation of quantity of solution concerns without much extrapolation on be-
half of the designer. It is intuitive that categories truncated to fewer digits (1,2)
should be further to and from the superfront (have worse optimal solution sets) than
those truncated to more digits (3,4, and X, which indicates no truncation), all other
things assumed equal.
This is seen in Table 4.4, which is organized in ascending order. The scaled
column specifies the percent difference between the corresponding distance and the
smallest value scale over the range of distance values. Unsurprisingly,the solution set
generated without truncation is located with the smallest values at the top (bolded).
As expected, several 1 and 2-digit truncations are located in the bottom half, having
large average distances to the superfront and indicating that more truncated solution
sets have less optimal solutions than less truncated solution sets.
Should all truncation categories be assumed equal, the expectation would be that
the table should have an evenly distributed array of truncation categories throughout,
differentiated only by digits truncated. However, those truncation categories that
include ‘Input’ cluster at the bottom of the table, with large average distance to the
superfront indicating their comparative lack of Pareto values to truncation categories
that do not include ‘Input.’
Of interest is how the bottom four values are all truncation categories with 1-digit
truncations including ‘Input’, and the next four categories are 2-digit truncation in-
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cluding ‘Input’ rather than the other 1-digit truncations without ‘Input’ as a trunca-
tion category. This indicates that the truncation category does differentiate solution
set distance to superfront, suggesting that truncation categories including ‘Input’ are
of lower optimal quality.
Table 4.5 (organized likewise to Table 4.4), also shows a divergence in distances
from the superfront between truncation categories containing ‘Input’ and those that
do not. Distance from the superfront (when large) indicates a lack of solution diver-
sity, potentially accounting for the different ordering of truncation categories within
each group of decimal truncation from Table 4.4.
Despite noting these trends, all categories have close distance values except for
the last four (‘Input, Penalty, Constraint’, ‘Input’, ‘Input, Constraint’, and ‘Input,
Penalty’).
Both Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present sensible results. The consequences of truncating
‘Input’ (the specific ship dimension values) are much greater compared to trunca-
tion of ‘Penalty’ (the penalty function calculation) and ‘Constraint’ (the constraint
equations) due to the compounding and propagation of error. ‘Input’ values being
truncated have a greater effect as those values are the baseline of all of the optimizer
calculations. ‘Constraint’ and ‘Penalty’ values are more meta-evaluative, by respec-
tively computing a measure of unfitness and weighing the fitness score. Truncation
in these areas does not have nearly the same effect proliferation.
The difference between truncations containing ‘Input’ and those without is seen
for all four of the cases examined in Section 4.4.
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Truncation Categories Digits Truncated Distance From Superfront (Pareto) Scaled (%)
No Truncation X 0.05305 0
Penalty, Constraint 4 0.05372 0.65
Penalty 2 0.05398 0.91
Constraint 4 0.05497 1.87
Input, Constraint 4 0.05581 2.69
Penalty, Constraint 2 0.05612 2.99
Input, Penalty 4 0.05634 3.2
Input, Penalty, Constraint 4 0.05649 3.35
Input 4 0.05666 3.51
Penalty, Constraint 3 0.05691 3.76
Input, Penalty, Constraint 3 0.05714 3.99
Constraint 2 0.05739 4.23
Penalty 4 0.05745 4.29
Penalty 3 0.05788 4.7
Input, Penalty 3 0.05789 4.72
Input 3 0.05867 5.47
Constraint 3 0.05891 5.7
Input, Constraint 3 0.05959 6.37
Constraint 1 0.06282 9.51
Penalty 1 0.06321 9.9
Penalty, Constraint 1 0.0651 11.74
Input 2 0.06996 16.47
Input, Constraint 2 0.07337 19.79
Input, Penalty, Constraint 2 0.07471 21.1
Input, Penalty 2 0.07549 21.85
Input, Penalty 1 0.14201 86.65
Input, Penalty, Constraint 1 0.14355 88.15
Input 1 0.1455 90.04
Input, Constraint 1 0.15572 100
Table 4.5: Average Distance From Superfront (Pareto) for All Datasets
4.3 Description of Cases
Four cases are examined in this dissertation. Section 4.1 describes how the designer
determines which terms to consider. Each of the terms (‘more truncation’, ‘useful
optimizer’, and ‘enough solutions’) require a quantitative definition.
Possible definitions for ‘more truncation’ include a certain amount of rounding to
specific decimal places. Definitions for ‘useful optimizer’ may involve the fraction of
total solutions on the final Pareto front, or the number of solutions ever on the Pareto
front. ‘Enough solutions’ may be defined as the quantity of feasible solutions, or as a
ratio of Pareto solutions to feasible solutions. Any of these definitions can be used.
57
The designer selects ones she deems representative of her hunch. If she is primarily
concerned about how truncation affects feasible solutions, she may define ‘enough
solutions’ as some function of total feasible solutions rather than from the number of
Pareto optimal solutions. The corresponding threshold value is also determined from
designer perspective.
For all cases presented, Table 4.6 lists threshold values and definitions for each
term.
Term Definition Threshold
More truncation component value decimal places < 3
Useful optimizer % Pareto final / total solutions > 0.07696
Enough solutions % feasible / total solutions > 0.4778
Table 4.6: Term Definitions and Thresholds
‘More truncation’ is defined as component values rounded to less than three dec-
imal places. ‘Useful optimizer’ is defined as percentage of Pareto final solutions to
total solutions greater than 0.07696. ‘Enough solutions’ is defined as percentage of
feasible solutions to total solutions greater than 0.4778. These threshold numbers
were determined from average values of definitions which attempt to quantify the
designer’s thoughts behind each term.
These definitions and thresholds may only be a first, initial determination. Further
examination and testing may reveal more appropriate values for adjusted definitions,
which is not something included in the scope of this work’s cases. Using a mean value
for initial quantitative thresholds allows for easier identification and thus adjustment
of values as needed.
In order to present a manageable case comparison for framework proof of concept,
all cases use the same terms and definitions from Table 4.6. There are six possible
combinations of syllogism term assignments for the subject, predicate, and middle
terms as cases. Of these six, four are selected as relevant conclusions constructed for
decision-making.
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The middle term is the connecting term between premises. The subject term
arbitrates what the conclusion statement is about. The predicate term expresses the
essential thought about the subject as a property the subject has or is characterized
by.
Due to the designer’s concerns about truncation as affecting tool appropriateness,
no cases are assigned ‘more truncation’ as the middle term. The designer certainly
wishes to know either about the truncation (subject) or about the subject’s trunca-
tion (predicate). Should truncation be the connecting (middle) term, the conclusion
examined for sufficiency would not be about or determined by truncation and thus
of little interest to the designer.
Therefore this chapter will examine four cases out of the six possible combinations.
Table 4.7 lists the assignment of the syllogism subject, predicate, and middle terms
for each case examined in this chapter.
Subject Term Predicate Term Middle Term
Case 1 More Truncation Useful Optimizer Enough Solutions
Case 2 More Truncation Enough Solutions Useful Optimizer
Case 3 Enough Solutions More Truncation Useful Optimizer
Case 4 Useful Optimizer More Truncation Enough Solutions
Table 4.7: Case Term Assignment
All cases will compare the same seven truncation categories (listed in Table 4.1)
and use the datasets described in Section 4.2. Each case has a unique term assign-
ment with three syllogism arrangements: deductive (AAA1), abductive (AAA2), and
inductive (AAA3) syllogisms.
Within a case, deduction and induction have identical major premises. Deduction
and abduction have identical minor premises. All syllogisms for a case have identical
conclusions. Separate case conclusions can be compared both quantitatively and
semantically. The four case conclusions are semantically distinct and correspond to
different aspects of the designer’s motivating notions.
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Case 1
The three hypothesis syllogisms for Case 1 are as follows:
Deduction (AAA1):
Enough solutions indicate a useful optimizer
A more truncated optimizer produces enough solutions
A more truncated optimizer is still a useful optimizer
Abduction (AAA2):
A useful optimizer produces enough solutions
A more truncated optimizer produces enough solutions
A more truncated optimizer is still a useful optimizer
Induction (AAA3):
Enough solutions indicate a useful optimizer
Enough solutions are generated from more truncated optimizers
A more truncated optimizer is still a useful optimizer
The conclusion statement of Case 1 can be clearly seen to come directly from the
designer’s hunch that more truncation still allows for a useful optimizer.
In regards to the comparison of two statements with flipped first and second terms
(such as the middle term and predicate term of the major premise for deduction
and abduction): it can be seen that these two statements cannot be assumed to be
the inverse of each other (mutually exclusive). ‘Enough solutions indicates a useful




The three hypothesis syllogisms for Case 2 are as follows:
Deduction (AAA1):
A useful optimizer produces enough solutions
A more truncated optimizer is a useful optimizer
A more truncated optimizer has enough solutions
Abduction (AAA2):
Enough solutions indicate a useful optimizer
A more truncated optimizer is a useful optimizer
A more truncated optimizer has enough solutions
Induction (AAA3):
A useful optimizer produces enough solutions
A useful optimizer can be a more truncated optimizer
A more truncated optimizer has enough solutions
Case 1’s conclusion: ‘a more truncated optimizer is still a useful optimizer’ and
Case 2’s conclusion: ‘a more truncated optimizer has enough solutions’ have the same
subject term of ‘more truncation’ with differing predicate terms.
Both conclusions’ predicate terms speak to the concerns of the designer. Case
2 follows from a corresponding hunch to of Case 1’s motivating questions. Case 1’s
conclusion came from the designer’s hunch that more truncation would still allow for
a useful optimizer. A useful optimizer stems from concern over rareness of Pareto
solutions from a truncated optimizer. In Case 2, enough solutions is a re-prioritized
objective stemming from concern over lack of feasible solutions and inspires this case’s
conclusion. The predicate term indicates the specifics of the designer’s motivations
while the subject term provides the context.
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The specific impact on sufficiency of assignment of the same subject term with
flipped predicate and middle terms can be investigated when corresponding syllogisms
from Case 1 and 2 are compared.
Case 3
The three hypothesis syllogisms for Case 3 are as follows:
Deduction (AAA1):
A useful optimizer can be a more truncated optimizer
Enough solutions indicate a useful optimizer
Enough solutions are generated from more truncated optimizers
Abduction (AAA2):
A more truncated optimizer is a useful optimizer
Enough solutions indicate a useful optimizer
Enough solutions are generated from more truncated optimizers
Induction (AAA3):
A useful optimizer can be a more truncated optimizer
A useful optimizer produces enough solutions
Enough solutions are generated from more truncated optimizers
Case 3 and Case 2 have the same middle term and flipped subject and predicate
terms. Subject terms set the context of a statement while predicate terms describe
the context of a statement.
For Case 3, the subject term is ‘enough solutions’ instead of the Case 2 term:
‘more truncation’. Rather than considering ‘enough solutions’ as the essential thought
about ‘more truncation’, now ‘enough solutions’ is the subject and ‘more truncation’
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is the essential thought about it. Depending on the case, ‘enough solutions’ or ‘more
truncation’ determines the context the other operates in.
Neither of these constructions is necessarily better as both tell different stories
about what is needed to reach sufficiency for designer decision-making. Case 2 indi-
cates more concern on truncation producing enough solutions while Case 3 implies
that with enough solutions, truncation will be less crucial.
The specific impact of swapped subject and predicate terms on conclusion suf-
ficiency can be investigated when corresponding syllogisms from Case 2 and 3 are
compared.
Case 4
The three hypothesis syllogisms for Case 4 are as follows:
Deduction (AAA1):
Enough solutions are generated from more truncated optimizers
A useful optimizer produces enough solutions
A useful optimizer can be a more truncated optimizer
Abduction (AAA2):
A more truncated optimizer has enough solutions
A useful optimizer produces enough solutions
A useful optimizer can be a more truncated optimizer
Induction (AAA3):
Enough solutions are generated from more truncated optimizers
Enough solutions indicate a useful optimizer
A useful optimizer can be a more truncated optimizer
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Case 4 and Case 3 share the predicate term: ‘more truncation’. As described
previously, this conclusion implies that with a useful optimizer, truncation will be
less crucial. The subject term provides the context for which the predicate term is
describing.
The impact of the assignment of the predicate term can be compared with corre-
sponding syllogisms from Case 3 and 4. By swapping the middle and subject terms,
the semantic strength of the middle term connecting the minor and major premises
can be examined.
4.4 Case Results
4.4.1 Result Analysis Key
A brief discussion for interpretation of result values is required to better under-
stand each case’s probability distribution and mutual information values presented in
this section.
CPTs
In order to interpret probability results, each statement below provides a key to
understanding different values of each conditional probability table.
P(Minor Premise|Major Premise) can be interpreted as “given the cognizance that
the major premise is some value, the minor premise being True is/is not likely.” This
indicates a strong/weak relationship between the two premises.
P(Conclusion Statement|Major Premise) can be interpreted as “given the cog-
nizance that the major premise is some value, the conclusion being True is/is not
likely.” This indicates a strong/weak contribution from the major premise and pred-
icate term to the conclusion.
P(Conclusion Statement|Minor Premise) can be interpreted as “given the cog-
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nizance that the minor premise is some value, the conclusion being True is/is not
likely.” This indicates a strong/weak contribution from the minor premise and sub-
ject term to the conclusion.
These definitions say ‘cognizance’ rather than a more absolutest declaration as
the nodal state is determined by the term definition set by the designer. A designer
defined and quantified these terms according to her perspective. These values are
thus not objective truths and should not be treated as such.
Sufficient tool-generated data requires some correlation between the conclusion
and the major and minor premises. Additionally, major and minor premises should
themselves be connected in this case since they are fundamentally related. Other
term or premise selections many not require a correlation between the major and
minor premise should they manifest as separate contributions to the conclusion.
Flat Mutual Information
Mutual information is more complicated to interpret than conditional probability.
Flat mutual information indicates the amount of mutual dependence between the
major premise, minor premise, and the conclusion. It measures how much knowing
about any statement, such as the major premise or the minor premise, reduces un-
certainty about another statement, such as the conclusion. For example, if the major
premise, minor premise, and conclusion are independent, then knowing one does not
give any information about the others, so their mutual information is zero. At the
other extreme, if one statement is a deterministic function of the the others, then
all information conveyed by one is shared with the others. Therefore knowing one
statement determines the value of the other statements and vice versa.
For sufficient conclusions for decision-making, a relationship between statements
is required as fully independent statements imply unrelated designer inferences. How-
ever, fully dependent or overly deterministic relationships are not desirable. Large
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flat mutual information values indicate duplication of knowledge in the statements
and suggests distinct, additional data should be generated and appraised. Deductive
reasoning instances structured in logically valid ways may have generated data suffi-
ciency with lower flat mutual information values than induction or abduction, which
often require larger values to connect inferences that do not have the benefit of such
a structure.
For flat mutual information, a negative value is a sign of synergy between state-
ments; that is, some kind of unexplained amplification related to hidden interde-
pendencies that this framework is not designed to identify. Interdependencies may
contribute to emergent design failures that a decision maker wishes to avoid.
Therefore, extreme values for flat mutual information (both very large and very
small) should be viewed with skepticism in regards to their merits for decision-making.
There is not a numerically ideal number to be reached for sufficient constructions for
decision-making as flat mutual information values must be compared across syllogism
constructions. Positive flat mutual information values indicate one (or more) of the
statements can provide information reducing uncertainty about the others. A zero
flat mutual information value means all three statements are independent and thus
dubious for decision-making.
Due to the construction of flat mutual information, AAA1 and AAA3 syllogisms
have the same value for corresponding truncation categories. This is due to the
shared major premise and priority over the minor premise in determining relevancy for
decision-making. In order to differentiate between deductive and inductive syllogisms,
this work utilizes a layered network with associated mutual information.
Layered Mutual Information
Layered mutual information allows for the differentiation between deductive and
inductive syllogisms. Ordering and prioritization of premises imitate the formation of
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path dependencies in design. By isolating the premises to a combined node, layered
mutual information can incisively evaluate the correlation of premises to conclusions
without the noise of major premise to minor premise contribution.
Layered mutual information is calculated from a network with a combined node
consisting of the major and minor premise. This allows for an evaluation of the
quantified mutual dependence of the premises with the conclusion. Layered mutual
information provides a more focused examination on how premises together can reduce
uncertainty about the conclusion. The structure of layered networks allows for the
incorporation of more than two premise nodes if desired, which is not demonstrated
in this work.
It is critical that there is a deterministic relationship between the combined
premises and the conclusion. Large positive values are desirable as that indicates
the conclusion can be understood based off of premise data. Preferably, a conclusion
has a strong relationship with the premises it is based on. Deduction, induction,
and abduction all have different expectations of combined premise contributions to
the conclusion. Deduction, with primarily logically valid structures, requires less cor-
relation to be sufficient. Induction and abduction do not have the benefit of such a
structure and so need a larger mutual information value to feel similarity comfortable.
For layered mutual information, a negative value indicates more non-relevant
events in comparison to relevant events and is a sign that term definitions should
be adjusted. Zero mutual information indicates independence between the premises
and the conclusion and is not desirable for decision-making.
4.4.2 Case 1
To enable the evaluation of tool-generated data as design inferences for decision-
making, probability distributions and mutual information of the associated network
for Case 1 are calculated. They are presented here.
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CPTs
Deduction and induction (AAA1 and AAA3) have the same major premise due to
their syllogism construction: ‘enough solutions indicate a useful optimizer’. The ma-
jor premise for abduction (AAA2) is ‘a useful optimizers produces enough solutions’.
Major = True Major = False Major = N/A
AAA1 & AAA3 AAA2 AAA1 & AAA3 AAA2 AAA1 & AAA3 AAA2
Input Penalty Constraint 0.529 0.529 0.442 0.027 0.029 0.444
Input Constraint 0.531 0.531 0.429 0.038 0.04 0.431
Input 0.525 0.525 0.383 0.04 0.092 0.435
Input Penalty 0.54 0.54 0.423 0.031 0.038 0.429
Penalty 0.95 0.95 0.008 0.042 0.042 0.008
Penalty Constraint 0.965 0.965 0.008 0.027 0.027 0.008
Constraint 0.96 0.96 0.006 0.033 0.033 0.006
Table 4.8: Major Premise Probabilities: Case 1
Table 4.8 shows differentiation in probabilities on truncation categories containing
‘Input’. When the nodal status of the major premise is True, the differentiation occurs
for all three syllogism constructions. When the nodal status of the major premise is
False or N/A, the differentiation only appears according to ‘useful optimizer’ term
positioning. For AAA2, ‘useful optimizer’ determines relevancy as the first term of
the major premise and so differentiation in truncation category probability is visible
for AAA2 when major premise nodal state is N/A. As the second term for AAA1 and
AAA3, it determines if the nodal state is True or False and can be seen for AAA1
and AAA3 when major premise nodal status is False.
Minor = True Minor = False Minor = N/A
AAA1 & AAA2 AAA3 AAA1 & AAA2 AAA3 AAA1 & AAA2 AAA3
Input Penalty Constraint 0.494 0.494 0.006 0.477 0.5 0.029
Input Constraint 0.496 0.496 0.004 0.465 0.5 0.04
Input 0.442 0.442 0.058 0.467 0.5 0.092
Input Penalty 0.488 0.488 0.013 0.475 0.5 0.038
Penalty 0.494 0.494 0.006 0.465 0.5 0.042
Penalty Constraint 0.498 0.498 0.002 0.475 0.5 0.027
Constraint 0.496 0.496 0.004 0.471 0.5 0.033
Table 4.9: Minor Statement Probabilities: Case 1
Deduction and abduction (AAA1 and AAA2) have the same minor premise due to
their syllogism construction: ‘a more truncated optimizer produces enough solutions’.
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The major premise for induction (AAA3) is ‘enough solutions are generated from more
truncated optimizers’.
Table 4.9 does not show large difference in probability values corresponding to
truncation categories. ‘Input’ is the largest value for AAA1 and AAA2 syllogisms
with Minor status of False, but the value is still within 0.05 of other AAA1 and
AAA2 Minor status False values. The minor premise is associated with the subject
and middle terms, and term assignment for Case 1 does not include ‘useful optimizer’
among those.
It should be noted that there appears to be a trend of additive truncation cate-
gories; that is ‘Input Penalty’ values are larger than individual ‘Input’ or ‘Penalty’,
and ‘Input Penalty Constraint’ is the largest. This trend does not persist completely
throughout all cases but in general, truncated categories stack probability values.
Conclusion = True Conclusion = False Conclusion = N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.06 0.44 0.5
Input Constraint 0.069 0.431 0.5
Input 0.069 0.431 0.5
Input Penalty 0.075 0.425 0.5
Penalty 0.494 0.006 0.5
Penalty Constraint 0.494 0.006 0.5
Constraint 0.496 0.004 0.5
Table 4.10: Conclusion Statement Probabilities: Case 1
Table 4.10 has the same values for each nodal state for all syllogisms as all syllo-
gisms in a case have the same conclusion: ‘a more truncated optimizer is still a useful
optimizer’. Since ‘useful optimizer’ is the predicate term for Case 1, the probability
values for conclusion statement nodal states of True and False differentiate based off
of truncation categories containing ‘Input’. The subject term ‘more truncation’ de-
termines relevancy. Due to the method of generating evidence (where even amounts
of 1,2,3 and 4-digit truncation occurred for all dataset runs) all probability values for
conclusion statement N/A nodal status are 0.5.
Probability values of conclusion statements with a True nodal status for truncation
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categories with ‘Input’ and those without are distinct. Those containing ‘Input’
are less than 0.08 while those not containing ‘Input’ are greater than 0.49. This
trend is flipped for probabilities of conclusion statements with False nodal status,
where truncation categories containing ‘Input’ are all greater than 0.42 and those not
containing ‘Input’ are less than 0.01. It is desirable to have a larger True conclusion
nodal status as that indicates the definitions chosen to conduct this analysis do not
immediately preclude decision construction from the minor and major premises.
It is concerning for decision sufficiency that truncation categories containing ‘In-
put’ have such a low True conclusion nodal status. If all truncation categories had
similarly low probabilities, it would be recommended to adjust term definitions and
reconsider term selection. However, since truncation categories not containing ‘Input’
have reasonably high True conclusion nodal status probabilities, it is an indication
that those truncation categories containing ‘Input’ are not suitably generated data
for decision-making.
Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0 0.894 0.991 0 0.009 0 0.214 0.786
Input Constraint 0.125 0 0.875 1 0 0 0 0.105 0.895
Input 0.119 0 0.881 0.989 0 0.011 0 0.636 0.364
Input Penalty 0.127 0 0.873 0.99 0 0.01 0 0.333 0.667
Penalty 0.513 0 0.487 0.75 0 0.25 0 0.15 0.85
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0 0.49 0.75 0 0.25 0 0.077 0.923
Constraint 0.512 0 0.488 0.667 0 0.333 0 0.125 0.875
Table 4.11: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA1 Syllogism: Case 1
Table 4.11 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise of
deduction (AAA1). As expected, differentiation on truncation categories containing
‘Input’ occurs for minor premise given major premise nodal states of True and False,
and not for N/A. This differentiation is much more pronounced for minor premise
given major premise True than for minor premise given major premise False.
The probability values of zero for minor premise False nodal status given major
premise nodal states of True or False and minor premise True status given major
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premise N/A status are due to the syllogism structure.
The bolded values are interesting. ‘Input’ has a much larger False minor premise
nodal status probability given N/A major premise nodal status, and also a corre-
sponding small N/A minor premise nodal status probability given N/A major premise
nodal status.
Of truncation categories without ‘Input’, there may be an indication of between
‘Penalty’ and ‘Constraint’ which one is more sufficient for decision-making. ‘Con-
straint’ truncation’s probability value for minor premise N/A nodal status given ma-
jor premise False nodal status is 0.333, which is significantly larger in comparison to
other truncation categories not containing ‘Input’. The same trend is apparent for
minor premise True nodal status given major premise False status, where ‘Constraint’
truncation category has significantly smaller probability values than other truncation
categories without ‘Input’.
Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0 0.894 0 0.154 0.846 0.986 0.005 0.009
Input Constraint 0.125 0 0.875 0 0.056 0.944 0.995 0.005 0
Input 0.119 0 0.881 0 0.158 0.842 0.871 0.12 0.01
Input Penalty 0.127 0 0.873 0 0.2 0.8 0.976 0.015 0.01
Penalty 0.513 0 0.487 0 0.15 0.85 0.75 0 0.25
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0 0.49 0 0.077 0.923 0.75 0 0.25
Constraint 0.512 0 0.488 0 0.125 0.875 0.667 0 0.333
Table 4.12: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA2 Syllogism: Case 1
Table 4.12 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise of
abduction (AAA2). As expected, differentiation on truncation categories containing
‘Input’ occurs for minor premise given major premise nodal states of True and N/A,
and not for False major premise nodal status. This differentiation is much more
pronounced for minor premise given major premise True than for minor premise
given major premise N/A.
The probability values of zero for minor premise False nodal status given major
premise True and minor premise True status given major premise False are due to
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the syllogism structure. If the major premise has a True nodal status, then the minor
premise nodal state must be either True or N/A (it cannot be False). If the major
premise has a False nodal status, the minor premise nodal state must be False or
N/A (it cannot be True). The structure of the syllogism requires this as AAA2 has
the middle term as the second term in both the minor and major premises.
The bolded values are curious. ‘Input’ has a much larger probability for minor
premise False nodal status given major premise N/A nodal status, and also a corre-
sponding relatively small minor premise True nodal status probability given major
premise N/A status when compared to other truncations categories containing ‘In-
put’. For truncations without ‘Input’, when the minor premise nodal status is False
given a N/A major premise nodal status, the probability is zero. This in contrast
with truncations containing ‘Input’ for the same circumstances that have small but
existing probabilities implies some not understood effect of truncation categories.
Similar to AAA1 in Table 4.11, there may be an indication between ‘Penalty’
and ‘Constraint’ of which one is more sufficient for decision-making. The probability
values of truncation category ‘Constraint’ for minor premise N/A nodal status given
major premise N/A nodal status is 0.333, which is significantly larger in comparison
to other truncation categories not containing ‘Input’. Because of the zero probability
value of ‘Constraint’ for minor premise False nodal status given major premise N/A
status, the same trend is apparent for minor premise True given major premise N/A.
Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0.894 0 0.991 0.009 0 0 0 1
Input Constraint 0.125 0.875 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Input 0.119 0.881 0 0.989 0.011 0 0 0 1
Input Penalty 0.127 0.873 0 0.99 0.01 0 0 0 1
Penalty 0.513 0.487 0 0.75 0.25 0 0 0 1
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0.49 0 0.75 0.25 0 0 0 1
Constraint 0.512 0.488 0 0.667 0.333 0 0 0 1
Table 4.13: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA3 Syllogism: Case 1
Table 4.13 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise of
72
induction (AAA3). As expected, differentiation on truncation categories containing
‘Input’ occurs for minor premise given major premise nodal states of True and False,
and not for major premise N/A nodal status.
The syllogism structure of induction has the middle term as the first term in both
the minor and major premises, therefore making it so that the minor premise has
N/A nodal status if and only if the major premise nodal status is N/A.
There is a larger difference between probabilities for truncation categories that
contain and do not contain ‘Input’ for minor premise given major premise True and
False nodal states (0.4 compared to 0.2).
For all syllogism constructions of deduction, abduction, and induction, truncations
without ‘Input’ have probability values for minor premise True nodal status given
major premise True nodal status just over 0.5. These circumstances indicate possible
sufficiency of the premises. The designer wants the minor premise to follow from
the major premise, and a higher probability indicates that. It is a good sign of
sufficiency for a conclusion to be constructed from two statements with True nodal
status, though a caveat for this situation is statements are primarily True only for
truncation categories not including ‘Input’.
Despite their True nodal status, these probabilities do not indicate actual correct-
ness but rather affirm the designer’s construction of what those premises are defined
as.
Similar to AAA1 in Table 4.11 and 4.12, the ‘Constraint’ category truncation
probability value for minor premise False nodal status given major premise False
nodal status is 0.333, which is significantly larger in comparison to other truncation
categories not containing ‘Input’. Because of the zero probability value of ‘Constraint’
category truncation for N/A minor premise given False major premise, the same trend
is apparent for True minor premise given False major premise.
Since deduction (AAA1) and induction (AAA3) have identical major premises
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Conclusion |Major = True Conclusion |Major = False Conclusion |Major = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0 0.894 0 0.991 0.009 0.143 0.071 0.786
Input Constraint 0.125 0 0.875 0 1 0 0.053 0.053 0.895
Input 0.119 0 0.881 0 0.989 0.011 0.068 0.568 0.364
Input Penalty 0.127 0 0.873 0 0.99 0.01 0.167 0.167 0.667
Penalty 0.513 0 0.487 0 0.75 0.25 0.15 0 0.85
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0 0.49 0 0.75 0.25 0.077 0 0.923
Constraint 0.512 0 0.488 0 0.667 0.333 0.125 0 0.875
Table 4.14: Conclusion Given Major Statement Probabilities for All Truncations of
AAA1 and AAA3 Syllogisms: Case 1
and conclusions, Table 4.14 shows conclusion probabilities given major premise for
both AAA1 and AAA3. Syllogism structure also requires that conclusion statements
with nodal status False have zero probability given major premise status of True, and
also for conclusion True nodal status for major premise False nodal status.
If the major premise has a N/A nodal status, ‘Input’ truncation has a 0.568
probability of a False nodal status, significantly more than any other False conclusion
status given N/A major status.
Probability values for ‘Constraint’ truncation category False and N/A conclusion
nodal state given False major premise state are similar to what was seen throughout
all three syllogisms’ minor premise given major premise tables. This could indicate
‘Constraint’ being more sufficient for decision-making over ‘Penalty’ but is not con-
clusive.
Conclusion |Major = True Conclusion |Major = False Conclusion |Major = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0 0.894 0.154 0 0.846 0 0.991 0.009
Input Constraint 0.125 0 0.875 0.056 0 0.944 0 1 0
Input 0.119 0 0.881 0.158 0 0.842 0 0.99 0.01
Input Penalty 0.127 0 0.873 0.2 0 0.8 0 0.99 0.01
Penalty 0.513 0 0.487 0.15 0 0.85 0 0.75 0.25
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0 0.49 0.077 0 0.923 0 0.75 0.25
Constraint 0.512 0 0.488 0.125 0 0.875 0 0.667 0.333
Table 4.15: Conclusion Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA2 Syllogism:
Case 1
Table 4.15 shows conclusion probabilities given major premise for abduction (AAA2).
It has the expected differentiation along ‘Input’ truncation categories for conclusion
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given major premise True and N/A nodal states. Conclusion status cannot be False if
the major premise is relevant (does not have a N/A nodal status) and cannot be True
if the major premise has a N/A nodal status. This is due to the AAA2 syllogism
structure where the predicate term is the first term of the major premise and the
second term of the conclusion.
The same trend in regards to ‘Constraint’ truncation category conclusion nodal
states of False and N/A given N/A major premise state (bolded) is seen.
Conclusion |Minor = True Conclusion |Minor = False Conclusion |Minor = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.114 0.886 0 0.667 0.333 0 0 0 1
Input Constraint 0.134 0.866 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 1
Input 0.142 0.858 0 0.107 0.893 0 0 0 1
Input Penalty 0.141 0.859 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 1
Penalty 0.987 0.013 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Penalty Constraint 0.987 0.013 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Constraint 0.992 0.008 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Table 4.16: Conclusion Given Minor Statement Probabilities for AAA1 and AAA2
Syllogisms: Case 1
Since deduction (AAA1) and abduction (AAA2) have identical minor premises
and conclusions, Table 4.16 shows conclusion probabilities given minor premise for
both AAA1 and AAA2. Syllogism structure also requires that conclusion statements
with nodal status N/A have zero probability given minor premise states of True or
False. AAA1 and AAA2 have the subject term as the first term in both the minor
premise and the conclusion, which manifests as probability of zero for conclusion
nodal states True and False given minor premise N/A nodal status and a probability
of one for conclusion N/A status given minor premise N/A status. The minor premise
determines the relevance of the conclusion statement for deduction and abduction.
As expected, there is a differentiation between truncation categories that include
and exclude ‘Input’ for conclusion given minor states True or False. ‘Input’ category
differentiates due to conclusion relevance.
The bolded values of ‘Input’ truncation category are significantly different than
other truncations for conclusion states True and False given minor premise False nodal
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status. The probability value for conclusion status True given minor premise False
nodal status is 0.107 which is less than a quarter of the next smallest value. This
is a strong indication that ‘Input’ truncation compared to ‘Penalty’ and ‘Constraint’
truncations are vastly different in terms of sufficiency. Potentially, these categories
are so opposite that the combination truncations (such as ‘Input Penalty’ and ‘Input
Constraint’) seem to split the difference in probability values. ‘Input Penalty Con-
straint’ is the closest combination truncation in value to the truncation categories
not containing ‘Input’. This may indicate that the probability or circumstances sur-
rounding the truncations are not fully additive after all if ‘Penalty’ and ‘Constraint’
dilute ‘Input’ truncation category’s affect on the probability value.
It is especially interesting because the desirable probability for conclusion status
True given minor premise status False is a low value. There is a reversal here for
truncations containing ‘Input’ and those not. Possibly, this is due to the small amount
of evidence for False minor premise nodal status for AAA1 and AAA2 as seen in Table
4.9.
Conclusion |Minor = True Conclusion |Minor = False Conclusion |Minor = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.114 0.886 0 0 0 1 0.143 0.071 0.786
Input Constraint 0.134 0.866 0 0 0 1 0.053 0.053 0.895
Input 0.142 0.858 0 0 0 1 0.068 0.568 0.364
Input Penalty 0.141 0.859 0 0 0 1 0.167 0.167 0.667
Penalty 0.987 0.013 0 0 0 1 0.15 0 0.85
Penalty Constraint 0.987 0.013 0 0 0 1 0.077 0 0.923
Constraint 0.992 0.008 0 0 0 1 0.125 0 0.875
Table 4.17: Conclusion Given Minor Statement Probabilities for AAA3 Syllogism:
Case 1
Table 4.17 shows conclusion probabilities given minor premise for induction (AAA3).
Syllogism structure of AAA3 requires that conclusion with nodal status N/A have
zero probability given minor premise status of True. AAA3 has the subject term po-
sitioned as the second term of the minor premise and the first term of the conclusion,
which manifests as zero probabilities for conclusion nodal states True and False given
minor premise False nodal status and a probability of one for conclusion N/A status
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given minor premise False.
As expected, there is a difference in probability values between truncation cate-
gories including ‘Input’ for conclusion given minor status True and to some extent
False.
Truncation categories not containing ‘Input’ have much higher probability values
for conclusion statement True nodal status given minor premise True nodal status
(over 0.98 compared to under 0.15). This is a strong indication of induction’s ability
to form sufficient decisions based off of the minor premise for truncation categories
not containing ‘Input’.
The bolded values of ‘Input’ truncation are significantly different than other trun-
cations for conclusion states False and N/A given minor premise N/A nodal status.
The probability value for conclusion status False given minor premise N/A nodal
status is 0.568 which is quadruple the next largest value. The probability value for
conclusion status N/A given minor premise N/A nodal status is 0.364 which is half
the next smallest value. Unlike Table 4.16 where a similar trend comes from the small
amount of evidence for False minor premise nodal states for AAA1 and AAA2, Table
4.9 indicates that lack of evidence is not the reason behind Table 4.17’s trend. More
investigation is required to understand this occurrence.
Flat Mutual Information
Flat mutual information represents the amount of mutual dependence between the
three distinct statements of the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclusion
statement.
Figure 4.1 shows large AAA1 and AAA3 values for truncation categories contain-
ing ‘Input’ (between 0.169 and 0.212) and small AAA1, AAA2, and AAA3 values
for truncation categories not containing ‘Input’ (between 0.005 and 0.015). Interest-
ingly, AAA2 mutual information values for truncation containing ‘Input’ are negative
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Figure 4.1: Flat Mutual Information: Case 1
AAA1 AAA2 AAA3
Input Constraint 0.205 -0.096 0.205
Input Penalty 0.192 -0.096 0.192
Penalty Constraint 0.012 0.006 0.012
Constraint 0.013 0.006 0.013
Input 0.169 -0.097 0.169
Penalty 0.015 0.005 0.015
Input Penalty Constraint 0.212 -0.088 0.212
Table 4.18: Flat Mutual Information Values for Case 1
(between -0.088 and -0.096).
Abduction, in comparison to deduction and induction, has a less rigorous structure
and thus less defined connections between statements. Abduction is an articulation
of an insight or hunch rather than a more direct application of a rule (deduction) or
test (induction), and so requires some amount of creativity. Negative values here may
indicate some emergent relationship between and due to statements rather than an
expected reduction in uncertainty had the mutual information values been positive.
Only truncation categories containing ‘Input’ are negative.
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Within truncation categories containing ‘Input’, visible differences in mutual in-
formation values imply the additive nature of truncation categories. For AAA1 and
AAA3, ‘Input’ alone is the smallest value and ‘Input, Penalty, Constraint’ is the
largest with ‘Input, Penalty’ and ‘Input, Constraint’ in the middle. The same trend
is present for AAA2 but the values are closer together as seen in Table 4.18.
It is apparent from the previously discussed probability distributions that trun-
cations containing ‘Input’ are not likely to be sufficient for decision-making. Since
‘Input’, ‘Penalty’, and ‘Constraint’ are representative of their combinatoric trends,
flat mutual information values for them are compared to investigate this in Table
4.19.
Syllogism Constraint Penalty Input
AAA1 and AAA3 0.013 0.015 0.169
AAA2 0.006 0.005 -0.097
Table 4.19: Comparing Flat Mutual Information Values for Singular Truncation Cat-
egories
‘Constraint’ and ‘Penalty’ are much smaller than ‘Input’. ‘Constraint’ is slightly
smaller than ‘Penalty’ for AAA1 and AAA3, but slightly larger for AAA2. Due to the
magnitude of ‘Input’ values for all three syllogisms, ‘Input’ is clearly inappropriate for
sufficient decision-making. The negativity of the ‘Input’ value for AAA2 is not why it
is not sufficient, but rather the largeness of the value is. Layered mutual information
will provide insights to differentiate between ‘Penalty’ and ‘Constraint’ and AAA1
and AAA3.
Layered Mutual Information
As mentioned previously, flat mutual information does not distinguish between
AAA1 and AAA3 syllogisms. Layered mutual information provides a differentiation
between deduction and induction and more clearly identifies the relationship between
the premises and the conclusion statement by combining both premises into one node.
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Figure 4.2: Layered Mutual Information: Case 1
AAA1 AAA2 AAA3
Input Constraint 0.344 1.013 1.189
Input Penalty 0.338 0.945 1.117
Penalty Constraint 0.345 0.324 0.018
Constraint 0.344 0.328 0.017
Input 0.306 0.878 1.045
Penalty 0.342 0.321 0.021
Input Penalty Constraint 0.342 1.063 1.255
Table 4.20: Layered Mutual Information Values: Case 1
Figure 4.2 shows layered mutual information values for Case 1. AAA1 has similar
layered mutual information values for all truncation categories. AAA2 has slight
separation in values between truncation categories with ‘Input’ and those without.
The separation between truncation categories is more pronounced for AAA3. Trivially
it would be understandable for AAA2 and AAA1 to have the most disparate values
with AAA3 somewhere in the middle as a general trend of structure strength, but
that does not agree with what these results show. This suggests that the framework
developed is able to make implications beyond the construction and ordering of terms
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within the premises. Syllogism structure is only one part of what makes up a sufficient
decision, and this shows that designer choice and conclusion affect generated solution
data.
Layered mutual information values suggest that when structured as a deductive
syllogism, any truncation category has a deterministic relationship between premises
and conclusion. It also implies the same for abduction truncation categories not
including ‘Input’. Induction has (corresponding to truncation categories with and
without ‘Input’) both too much and not enough dependence between the premises
and the conclusion for sufficient decision-making. However, sufficiency cannot be
definitively stated yet without comparative examinations of other premise construc-
tions. Other conclusions or combinations of terms may provide additional insights to
extend or narrow these judgements.
Case 1 demonstrates the value of the syllogistic Bayesian framework. Conditional
probability, flat mutual information, and layered mutual information values are cal-
culated to evaluate the generated data for design knowledge queries. Cases 2-4 will
show additional syllogism constructions for comparable evaluation of different term
assignments.
4.4.3 Case 2
To enable the evaluation of generated tool data as design inferences for decision-
making, probability distributions and mutual information of the associated network
for Case 2 are calculated. They are presented here.
CPTs
Due to their syllogism constructions, deduction and induction (AAA1 and AAA3)
have the same major premise: ‘a useful optimizer produces enough solutions’. The
major premise for abduction (AAA2) is ‘enough solutions indicate a useful optimizer’.
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Major = True Major = False Major = N/A
Syllogism: AAA1&AAA3 AAA2 AAA1&AAA3 AAA2 AAA1&AAA3 AAA2
Input Penalty Constraint 0.529 0.529 0.027 0.442 0.444 0.029
Input Constraint 0.531 0.531 0.038 0.429 0.431 0.04
Input 0.525 0.525 0.04 0.383 0.435 0.092
Input Penalty 0.54 0.54 0.031 0.423 0.429 0.038
Penalty 0.95 0.95 0.042 0.008 0.008 0.042
Penalty Constraint 0.965 0.965 0.027 0.008 0.008 0.027
Constraint 0.96 0.96 0.033 0.006 0.006 0.033
Table 4.21: Major Premise Probabilities for All Truncations: Case 2
Table 4.21 presents a difference in probability values for truncation categories
containing ‘Input’ and those not. When the nodal status of the major premise is
True, the differentiation occurs for all three syllogism constructions. When the nodal
state of the major premise is False or N/A, the differentiation only appears accord-
ing to ‘useful optimizer’ term positioning. For AAA1 and AAA3, ‘useful optimizer’
determines relevancy as the first term of the major premise and so differentiation in
truncation category probability is visible for AAA1 and AAA3 when major premise
nodal status is N/A. As the second term for AAA2, it determines if nodal state is
True or False and can be seen when major premise nodal status is False.
Minor = True Minor = False Minor = N/A
Syllogism: AAA1&AAA2 AAA3 AAA1&AAA2 AAA3 AAA1&AAA2 AAA3
Input Penalty Constraint 0.06 0.06 0.44 0.496 0.5 0.444
Input Constraint 0.069 0.069 0.431 0.5 0.5 0.431
Input 0.069 0.069 0.431 0.496 0.5 0.435
Input Penalty 0.075 0.075 0.425 0.496 0.5 0.429
Penalty 0.494 0.494 0.006 0.498 0.5 0.008
Penalty Constraint 0.494 0.494 0.006 0.498 0.5 0.008
Constraint 0.496 0.496 0.004 0.498 0.5 0.006
Table 4.22: Minor Statement Probabilities: Case 2
Deduction and abduction (AAA1 and AAA2) have the same minor premise due to
their syllogism construction: ‘a more truncated optimizer is a useful optimizer’. The
major premise for induction (AAA3) is ‘a useful optimizer can be a more truncated
optimizer’.
Table 4.22 shows differentiation in probabilities on truncation categories contain-
ing ‘Input’. When the nodal status of the minor premise is True, the differentiation
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occurs for all three syllogism constructions. When the nodal state of the major
premise is False or N/A, the differentiation only appears according to ‘useful opti-
mizer’ term positioning. For AAA3, ‘useful optimizer’ determines relevancy as the
first term of the minor premise and so differentiation in truncation category probabil-
ity is visible for AAA3 when major premise nodal status is N/A. As the second term
for AAA1 and AAA2, it determines True/False status and can be seen when minor
premise nodal status is False.
AAA1 and AAA2 have constant probability values of 0.5 for the minor premise
status of N/A due to the minor premise’s first term of ‘more truncation’ which deter-
mines relevancy. Due to the method of generating evidence (where even amounts of
1,2,3 and 4-digit truncation occurred for all dataset runs), AAA1 and AAA2 proba-
bilities for minor premise nodal status of N/A are 0.5.
Conclusion = True Conclusion = False Conclusion = N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.494 0.006 0.5
Input Constraint 0.496 0.004 0.5
Input 0.442 0.058 0.5
Input Penalty 0.488 0.013 0.5
Penalty 0.494 0.006 0.5
Penalty Constraint 0.498 0.002 0.5
Constraint 0.496 0.004 0.5
Table 4.23: Conclusion Statement Probabilities: Case 2
Table 4.23 has the same values for each nodal state for all syllogisms since all syl-
logisms in a case have the same conclusion: ‘a more truncated optimizer has enough
solutions’. Since ‘useful optimizer’ is the middle term for Case 2, there is no dif-
ferentiation based off of truncation categories containing ‘Input’ for the conclusion
statement as the conclusion is composed of the subject and predicate terms. The
subject term is ‘more truncation’ and determines relevancy. Due to the method of
generating evidence (where even amounts of 1,2,3 and 4-digit truncation occurred for
all dataset runs), all conclusion statement N/A nodal status probabilities are 0.5.
Probability values for conclusion statements with True nodal status for all trunca-
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tion categories are all greater than 0.44, with the lowest being the truncation category
of ‘Input’ at 0.442 (bolded), about 0.05 less than most other truncation categories
probability values. It is desirable to have a larger True conclusion nodal status as
that indicates the definitions chosen to conduct this analysis do not immediately pre-
clude decision construction from the major and minor premises due to the lack of
relationship. In this case, all truncation categories have intermediate to high True
conclusion nodal status probability values, indicating the connection is strong enough
to draw conclusions.
Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0 0.894 0.154 0 0.846 0 0.991 0.009
Input Constraint 0.125 0 0.875 0.056 0 0.944 0 1 0
Input 0.119 0 0.881 0.158 0 0.842 0 0.99 0.01
Input Penalty 0.127 0 0.873 0.2 0 0.8 0 0.99 0.01
Penalty 0.513 0 0.487 0.15 0 0.85 0 0.75 0.25
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0 0.49 0.077 0 0.923 0 0.75 0.25
Constraint 0.512 0 0.488 0.125 0 0.875 0 0.667 0.333
Table 4.24: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA1 Syllogism: Case 2
Table 4.24 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise of
deduction (AAA1). As expected, differentiation of probability values for truncation
categories containing ‘Input’ occurs for minor premise given major premise nodal
states of True and N/A, and not for False major premise nodal status, similar to
Table 4.21. This differentiation is much more pronounced for minor premise given
major premise True status than for minor premise given major premise N/A.
The zero probability values for False minor premise given True or False major
premise and True minor premise given N/A major premise are due to the syllogism
structure.
Of truncation categories without ‘Input’, there may be an indication between
‘Penalty’ and ‘Constraint’ of which one is more sufficient for decision-making. ‘Con-
straint’ truncation category probability value for minor premise N/A nodal status
given major premise False nodal status is 0.333, which is significantly larger in com-
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parison to other truncation categories not containing ‘Input’. The same trend is
apparent for minor premise True given major premise False, where ‘Constraint’ trun-
cation category probability is significantly less than other truncation categories with-
out ‘Input’. These numbers could be due to the lack of evidence when the major
premise nodal status is N/A as seen in Table 4.21 or they may indicate some other
distinction.
Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0 0.894 0 0.991 0.009 0.143 0.071 0.786
Input Constraint 0.125 0 0.875 0 1 0 0.053 0.053 0.895
Input 0.119 0 0.881 0 0.989 0.011 0.068 0.568 0.364
Input Penalty 0.127 0 0.873 0 0.99 0.01 0.167 0.167 0.667
Penalty 0.513 0 0.487 0 0.75 0.25 0.15 0 0.85
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0 0.49 0 0.75 0.25 0.077 0 0.923
Constraint 0.512 0 0.488 0 0.667 0.333 0.125 0 0.875
Table 4.25: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA2 Syllogism: Case 2
Table 4.25 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise for
abduction (AAA2). As expected, differentiation on truncation categories containing
‘Input’ occurs for minor premise given major premise nodal states of True and False,
and not for N/A major premise nodal status. This differentiation is much more
pronounced for minor premise given major premise True than for minor premise
given major premise N/A.
The probability values of zero for False minor premise given True major premise
and True minor premise given False major premise are due to the syllogism structure.
If the major premise has a True nodal status, then the minor premise nodal state must
be either True or N/A (it cannot be False). If the major premise has a False nodal
status, the minor premise nodal state must be False or N/A (it cannot be True). The
structure of the syllogism requires this as AAA2 has the middle term as the second
term in both the minor and major premises.
The bolded values are interesting. ‘Input’ has a much larger False minor premise
nodal status probability given N/A major premise nodal status probability, and also
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a corresponding relatively small True minor premise nodal status probability given
N/A major premise nodal status probability when compared to other truncations
including ‘Input’. For truncation categories without ‘Input’, when the minor premise
nodal status is False given a N/A major premise nodal status, the probability is
zero. This in contrast with truncation categories containing ‘Input’ for the same
circumstances that have small probabilities implies some not understood effect of
truncation categories.
Similar to AAA1 in Table 4.24, there may be an indication between ‘Penalty’ and
‘Constraint’ of which one is more sufficient for decision-making. ‘Constraint’ trun-
cation’s probability value for minor premise N/A nodal status given major premise
False nodal status is 0.333, which is significantly larger in comparison to other trun-
cation categories not containing ‘Input’. Because of the zero probability value of
‘Constraint’ for False minor premise given N/A major premise, the same trend is
apparent for False minor premise given False major premise.
Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0.894 0 0.154 0.846 0 0 0 1
Input Constraint 0.125 0.875 0 0.056 0.944 0 0 0 1
Input 0.119 0.881 0 0.158 0.842 0 0 0 1
Input Penalty 0.127 0.873 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 1
Penalty 0.513 0.487 0 0.15 0.85 0 0 0 1
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0.49 0 0.077 0.923 0 0 0 1
Constraint 0.512 0.488 0 0.125 0.875 0 0 0 1
Table 4.26: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA3 Syllogism: Case 2
Table 4.26 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise of
induction (AAA3). As expected, differentiation on truncation categories containing
‘Input’ occurs for minor premise given major premise nodal status of True, and not
for False or N/A major premise nodal states.
The syllogism structure of induction requires the middle term as the first term in
both the minor and major premises, thereby making it so that the minor premise has
a N/A nodal status if and only if the major premise nodal status is N/A.
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For all syllogism constructions of deduction, abduction, and induction, truncations
without ‘Input’ have the probability values for True minor premise nodal status given
True major premise nodal status just over 0.5. The designer wants the minor premise
to follow from the major premise, and a higher probability indicates this. This is a
positive indication of sufficiency for truncation categories not including ‘Input’.
Conclusion |Major = True Conclusion |Major = False Conclusion |Major = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0 0.894 0 0.154 0.846 0.986 0.005 0.009
Input Constraint 0.125 0 0.875 0 0.056 0.944 0.995 0.005 0
Input 0.119 0 0.881 0 0.158 0.842 0.871 0.12 0.01
Input Penalty 0.127 0 0.873 0 0.2 0.8 0.976 0.015 0.01
Penalty 0.513 0 0.487 0 0.15 0.85 0.75 0 0.25
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0 0.49 0 0.077 0.923 0.75 0 0.25
Constraint 0.512 0 0.488 0 0.125 0.875 0.667 0 0.333
Table 4.27: Conclusion Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA1 and AAA3
Syllogisms: Case 2
Since deduction (AAA1) and induction (AAA3) have identical major premises and
conclusions, Table 4.27 shows conclusion probabilities given major premise for both
AAA1 and AAA3. Syllogism structure also requires that conclusion statements with
nodal status False have zero probability given major premise status of True, and also
for conclusion statements True nodal status given major premise False nodal status.
‘Constraint’ truncation category False and N/A conclusion nodal state given False
major premise status has similar probability values to what was seen for AAA1 and
AAA2’s minor premise given major premise tables, potentially indicating ‘Constraint’
being more sufficient for decision-making over ‘Penalty’ but is inconclusive. It is
interesting that AAA3 did not exhibit this behavior for minor premise given major
premise, but is showing it here for conclusion given major premise.
Table 4.28 shows conclusion probabilities given major premise for abduction (AAA2).
It has the expected differentiation along ‘Input’ truncation categories for conclusion
given major premise True and False nodal states. Conclusion status cannot be False
if the major premise is relevant (does not have a N/A nodal status) and cannot be
True if the major premise has a N/A nodal status. This is due to the AAA2 syllo-
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Conclusion |Major = True Conclusion |Major = False Conclusion |Major = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0 0.894 0.991 0 0.009 0 0.214 0.786
Input Constraint 0.125 0 0.875 1 0 0 0 0.105 0.895
Input 0.119 0 0.881 0.989 0 0.011 0 0.636 0.364
Input Penalty 0.127 0 0.873 0.99 0 0.01 0 0.333 0.667
Penalty 0.513 0 0.487 0.75 0 0.25 0 0.15 0.85
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0 0.49 0.75 0 0.25 0 0.077 0.923
Constraint 0.512 0 0.488 0.667 0 0.333 0 0.125 0.875
Table 4.28: Conclusion Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA2 Syllogism:
Case 2
gism structure where the predicate term is the first term of the major premise and
the second term of the conclusion.
If the major premise has a N/A nodal status, ‘Input’ truncation has a 0.636
probability of a False nodal status, significantly more than any other False conclusion
status given N/A major status.
The trend is repeated in regards to ‘Constraint’ truncation’s True and N/A con-
clusion nodal states given False major premise status (bolded in Table 4.28).
Conclusion |Minor = True Conclusion |Minor = False Conclusion |Minor = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.931 0.069 0 0.995 0.005 0 0 0 1
Input Constraint 0.97 0.03 0 0.995 0.005 0 0 0 1
Input 0.909 0.091 0 0.879 0.121 0 0 0 1
Input Penalty 0.917 0.083 0 0.985 0.015 0 0 0 1
Penalty 0.987 0.013 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Penalty Constraint 0.996 0.004 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Constraint 0.992 0.008 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Table 4.29: Conclusion Given Minor Statement Probabilities for AAA1 and AAA2
Syllogisms: Case 2
Deduction (AAA1) and abduction (AAA2) have identical minor premises and
conclusions, thus Table 4.29 shows conclusion probabilities given minor premise for
both AAA1 and AAA2. Syllogism structure also requires that conclusion with nodal
status N/A have zero probability given minor premise states of True or False. AAA1
and AAA2 have the subject term as the first term in both the minor premise and
the conclusion statement, which manifests as zero probabilities for conclusion nodal
states True and False given minor premise N/A nodal status and a probability of
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one for conclusion N/A status given minor premise N/A status. The minor premise
determines the relevance of the conclusion statement for deduction and abduction.
As expected, there is no differentiation between truncation categories including
‘Input’.
The high probabilities (over 0.9) of conclusion True nodal status given minor
premise True nodal status are interesting, especially in contrast with the likewise
high probabilities of conclusion True nodal status given minor premise False nodal
status. In isolation, the first would indicate sufficiency for decision-making, but when
compared, it may be a sign only of an appropriately defined conclusion term. More
investigation is required to understand this occurrence.
Conclusion |Minor = True Conclusion |Minor = False Conclusion |Minor = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.931 0.069 0 0 0 1 0.986 0.005 0.009
Input Constraint 0.97 0.03 0 0 0 1 0.995 0.005 0
Input 0.909 0.091 0 0 0 1 0.871 0.12 0.01
Input Penalty 0.917 0.083 0 0 0 1 0.976 0.015 0.01
Penalty 0.987 0.013 0 0 0 1 0.75 0 0.25
Penalty Constraint 0.996 0.004 0 0 0 1 0.75 0 0.25
Constraint 0.992 0.008 0 0 0 1 0.667 0 0.333
Table 4.30: Conclusion Given Minor Statement Probabilities for AAA3 Syllogism:
Case 2
Table 4.30 shows conclusion probabilities given minor premise for induction (AAA3).
Syllogism structure of AAA3 requires that conclusion statement with nodal status
N/A have zero probability given minor premise status of True. AAA3 has the sub-
ject term as the second term of the minor premise and the first term of the conclusion,
which manifests as zero probabilities for conclusion nodal states True and False given
minor premise False nodal status and a probability of one for conclusion N/A status
given minor premise False status .
As expected, there is a differentiation between truncation categories including
‘Input’ for conclusion statements given minor status N/A, though small.
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Figure 4.3: Flat Mutual Information: Case 2
AAA1 AAA2 AAA3
Input Constraint -0.096 0.205 -0.096
Input Penalty -0.096 0.192 -0.096
Penalty Constraint 0.006 0.012 0.006
Constraint 0.006 0.013 0.006
Input -0.097 0.169 -0.097
Penalty 0.005 0.015 0.005
Input Penalty Constraint -0.088 0.212 -0.088
Table 4.31: Flat Mutual Information Values: Case 2
Flat Mutual Information
Figure 4.3 shows relatively large flat mutual information values (AAA1 and AAA3:
-0.088 to -0.097, AAA2: 0.169 to 0.212) for truncation categories containing ‘Input’
across all three syllogisms when compared to truncation categories not containing
‘Input’. In contrast to similar values from Case 1, these are small. All syllogisms
have small values for truncation categories not containing ‘Input’ (between 0.005 and
0.015). Interestingly, AAA1 and AAA3 values for truncation containing ‘Input’ are
negative, in a reversal of the expectation that only AAA2 would have negative flat
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mutual information values.
Generally, negativity here indicates some emergent relationship between and due
to statements rather than an expected reduction in uncertainty, and while for abduc-
tion that may be acceptable and still result in sufficient decision-making, it is not
likewise so for deduction and induction which by nature are more rigid reasoning in-
stances. Thus, negative values here indicate lack of suitability of the generated data
for knowledge queries.
The same differentiations that were present in Case 1 that imply the additive
nature of truncation categories are present here in Case 2 as well. For AAA2, ‘Input’ is
the smallest value and ‘Input, Penalty, Constraint’ is the largest with ‘Input, Penalty’
and ‘Input, Constraint’ in the middle. The same trend is present for AAA3 but the
values are closer together as seen in Table 4.31.
It is apparent from the previously discussed probability distributions that trunca-
tions containing ‘Input’ are not likely to be sufficient for decision-making. Addition-
ally, AAA1 and AAA3 are likely not sufficient either, due to the term assignment of
this case. Possibly ‘enough solutions’ as the predicate term does not provide a strong
enough descriptor about truncation in conclusion for decision-making.
Layered Mutual Information
AAA1 AAA2 AAA3
Input Constraint 0.049 0.037 -0.096
Input Penalty 0.055 0.026 -0.098
Penalty Constraint 0.342 0.333 0.008
Constraint 0.344 0.328 0.01
Input 0.048 0.029 -0.088
Penalty 0.342 0.321 0.011
Input Penalty Constraint 0.046 0.023 -0.091
Table 4.32: Layered Mutual Information Values: Case 2
Figure 4.4 has an opposite trend than expected: truncation categories not con-
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Figure 4.4: Layered Mutual Information: Case 2
taining ‘Input’ have larger layered mutual information values than those containing
‘Input’ for AAA1 and AAA2. The usual trend returns for AAA3. All values for lay-
ered mutual information are relatively small when compared with those seen in Case
1. Small layered mutual information values indicate a lack of suitability of generated
data for knowledge queries.
The differentiation between truncation categories with ‘Input’ and those without
is slightly less for AAA2 than AAA1, which emphasizes the insufficiency of AAA2
specifically. Abduction does not have the structure strength deduction has and so
to also lack the connectivity between premises and conclusion implied by the layered
mutual information values does not provide confidence of sufficiency in that decision
instance.
Negative values for AAA3 indicate a large amount of non-relevant events in com-
parison to relevant events. Induction, which is the generalization of a trend from
data, cannot be used appropriately in circumstances that lack data. This may change
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should term definitions be adjusted. These observations imply that Case 2 is not suf-
ficient for decision-making.
4.4.4 Case 3
To enable the evaluation of generated tool data as design inferences for decision-
making, probability distributions between statements and mutual information of the
associated network for Case 3 are calculated. They are presented here.
CPTs
Major = True Major = False Major = N/A
Syllogism: AAA1&AAA3 AAA2 AAA1&AAA3 AAA2 AAA1&AAA3 AAA2
Input Penalty Constraint 0.06 0.06 0.496 0.44 0.444 0.5
Input Constraint 0.069 0.069 0.5 0.431 0.431 0.5
Input 0.069 0.069 0.496 0.431 0.435 0.5
Input Penalty 0.075 0.075 0.496 0.425 0.429 0.5
Penalty 0.494 0.494 0.498 0.006 0.008 0.5
Penalty Constraint 0.494 0.494 0.498 0.006 0.008 0.5
Constraint 0.496 0.496 0.498 0.004 0.006 0.5
Table 4.33: Major Premise Probabilities: Case 3
Due to their syllogism construction, deduction and induction (AAA1 and AAA3)
have the same major premise: ‘a useful optimizer can be a more truncated optimizer’.
The major premise for abduction (AAA2) is ‘a more truncated optimizer is a useful
optimizer’.
Table 4.33 shows differentiation in probability values for truncation categories
containing ‘Input’. When the nodal status of the major premise is True, the differ-
entiation occurs for all three syllogism constructions. When the nodal state of the
major premise is False or N/A, the differentiation only appears according to ‘use-
ful optimizer’ term positioning. For AAA1 and AAA3, ‘useful optimizer’ determines
relevancy as the first term of the major premise and so the difference in truncation
category probability values is visible for AAA1 and AAA3 when major premise nodal
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status is N/A. As the second term for AAA2, it determines if nodal status is True or
False and can be seen when major premise nodal status is False.
Minor = True Minor = False Minor = N/A
Syllogism: AAA1&AAA2 AAA3 AAA1&AAA2 AAA3 AAA1&AAA2 AAA3
Input Penalty Constraint 0.529 0.529 0.442 0.027 0.029 0.444
Input Constraint 0.531 0.531 0.429 0.038 0.04 0.431
Input 0.525 0.525 0.383 0.04 0.092 0.435
Input Penalty 0.54 0.54 0.423 0.031 0.038 0.429
Penalty 0.95 0.95 0.008 0.042 0.042 0.008
Penalty Constraint 0.965 0.965 0.008 0.027 0.027 0.008
Constraint 0.96 0.96 0.006 0.033 0.033 0.006
Table 4.34: Minor Statement Probabilities: Case 3
Deduction and abduction (AAA1 and AAA2) have the same minor premise due
to their syllogism construction: ‘enough solutions indicate a useful optimizer’. The
major premise for induction (AAA3) is ‘a useful optimizer produces enough solutions’.
Table 4.34 shows differentiation in probabilities for truncation categories contain-
ing ‘Input’. When the nodal status of the minor premise is True, the differentiation
occurs for all three syllogism constructions. When the nodal state of the major
premise is False or N/A, the differentiation only appears according to ‘useful opti-
mizer’ term positioning. For AAA3, ‘useful optimizer’ determines relevancy as the
first term of the minor premise and so differentiation in truncation category proba-
bility is visible for AAA3 when major premise nodal status is N/A. As the second
term for AAA1 and AAA2, it determines if nodal state is True or False and can be
seen when minor premise nodal status is False.
Conclusion = True Conclusion = False Conclusion = N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.494 0.477 0.029
Input Constraint 0.496 0.465 0.04
Input 0.442 0.467 0.092
Input Penalty 0.488 0.475 0.038
Penalty 0.494 0.465 0.042
Penalty Constraint 0.498 0.475 0.027
Constraint 0.496 0.471 0.033
Table 4.35: Conclusion Statement Probabilities: Case 3
Table 4.35 has the same probability values for each nodal state for all syllogisms
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because all syllogisms in a case have the same conclusion: ‘enough solutions are
generated from more truncated optimizers’. Since ‘useful optimizer’ is the middle
term for Case 3, there is no differentiation based off of truncation categories containing
‘Input’ for the conclusion statement as it is composed of the subject and predicate
terms.
For all truncation categories, conclusion statements with a True nodal status are
all greater than 0.44, with the lowest being the truncation category of ‘Input’ at 0.442
(bolded), about 0.05 less than most other truncation categories probability values.
‘Input’ truncation also has the largest of the small set of N/A conclusion status at
0.092. It is desirable to have a larger True conclusion statement nodal status as that
indicates the definitions chosen to conduct this analysis with do not immediately
preclude decision construction from the minor and major premises. For Case 3, all
truncation categories have reasonably high conclusion statement nodal status True
probabilities.
Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.931 0 0.069 0.954 0 0.046 0 0.995 0.005
Input Constraint 0.97 0 0.03 0.929 0 0.071 0 0.995 0.005
Input 0.909 0 0.091 0.933 0 0.067 0 0.88 0.12
Input Penalty 0.917 0 0.083 0.95 0 0.05 0 0.985 0.015
Penalty 0.987 0 0.013 0.929 0 0.071 0 1 0
Penalty Constraint 0.996 0 0.004 0.95 0 0.05 0 1 0
Constraint 0.992 0 0.008 0.941 0 0.059 0 1 0
Table 4.36: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA1 Syllogism: Case 3
Table 4.36 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise
for deduction (AAA1).
The zero probability values for False minor premise given True or False major
premise and True minor premise given N/A major premise are due to the syllogism
structure. The same is true for minor premise nodal status True given major premise
nodal status N/A.
Table 4.37 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise
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Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.931 0 0.069 0 0.995 0.005 0.946 0.008 0.046
Input Constraint 0.97 0 0.03 0 0.995 0.005 0.929 0 0.071
Input 0.909 0 0.091 0 0.879 0.121 0.925 0.008 0.067
Input Penalty 0.917 0 0.083 0 0.985 0.015 0.942 0.008 0.05
Penalty 0.987 0 0.013 0 1 0 0.925 0.004 0.071
Penalty Constraint 0.996 0 0.004 0 1 0 0.946 0.004 0.05
Constraint 0.992 0 0.008 0 1 0 0.938 0.004 0.058
Table 4.37: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA2 Syllogism: Case 3
for abduction (AAA2).
The probability values of zero for False minor premise given True major premise
and True minor premise given False major premise are due to the syllogism structure.
If the major premise has a True nodal status, then the minor premise nodal state must
be either True or N/A (it cannot be False). If the major premise has a False nodal
status, the minor premise nodal state must be False or N/A (it cannot be True). The
structure of the syllogism requires this as AAA2 has the middle term as the second
term in both the minor and major premises.
The bolded values are interesting. ‘Input’ has a slightly smaller False minor
premise nodal status probability given False major premise nodal status, and also
a corresponding relatively large N/A minor premise nodal status probability given
False major premise nodal status when compared to other truncation categories that
contain ‘Input’.
Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.931 0.069 0 0.954 0.046 0 0 0 1
Input Constraint 0.97 0.03 0 0.929 0.071 0 0 0 1
Input 0.909 0.091 0 0.933 0.067 0 0 0 1
Input Penalty 0.917 0.083 0 0.95 0.05 0 0 0 1
Penalty 0.987 0.013 0 0.929 0.071 0 0 0 1
Penalty Constraint 0.996 0.004 0 0.95 0.05 0 0 0 1
Constraint 0.992 0.008 0 0.941 0.059 0 0 0 1
Table 4.38: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA3 Syllogism: Case 3
Table 4.38 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise
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for induction (AAA3). The syllogism structure of induction has the middle term as
the first term in both the minor and major premises, therefore making it so that the
minor premise has a N/A nodal status if and only if the major premise nodal status
is N/A.
Conclusion |Major = True Conclusion |Major = False Conclusion |Major = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.931 0 0.069 0 0.954 0.046 0.986 0.009 0.005
Input Constraint 0.97 0 0.03 0 0.929 0.071 0.995 0 0.005
Input 0.909 0 0.091 0 0.933 0.067 0.871 0.01 0.12
Input Penalty 0.917 0 0.083 0 0.95 0.05 0.976 0.01 0.015
Penalty 0.987 0 0.013 0 0.929 0.071 0.75 0.25 0
Penalty Constraint 0.996 0 0.004 0 0.95 0.05 0.75 0.25 0
Constraint 0.992 0 0.008 0 0.941 0.059 0.667 0.333 0
Table 4.39: Conclusion Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA1 and AAA3
Syllogisms: Case 3
Since deduction (AAA1) and induction (AAA3) have identical major premises
and conclusions, Table 4.39 shows conclusion probabilities given major premise for
both AAA1 and AAA3. Syllogism structure also requires that conclusion statements
with nodal status False have zero probability given major premise status of True.
Conclusion statements with True nodal status given major premise False nodal status
also have zero probability.
Differentiation of truncation categories with and without ‘Input’ is evident for
conclusion statement given major premise with True and N/A nodal status, and the
differentiation is comparatively small for conclusion given major premise True.
Bolded values in Table 4.39 show that ‘Input’ has a smaller True conclusion nodal
status probability given N/A major premise nodal status, and a corresponding rela-
tively large N/A conclusion nodal status probability given N/A major premise nodal
status when compared to other truncations including ‘Input’. Interestingly, ‘Input’
truncation category probability is closer to the median probability values rather than
the maximum.
Table 4.40 shows conclusion probabilities given major premise for abduction (AAA2).
The expected differentiation along ‘Input’ truncation categories for conclusion state-
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Conclusion |Major = True Conclusion |Major = False Conclusion |Major = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.931 0 0.069 0.995 0 0.005 0 0.954 0.046
Input Constraint 0.97 0 0.03 0.995 0 0.005 0 0.929 0.071
Input 0.909 0 0.091 0.879 0 0.121 0 0.933 0.067
Input Penalty 0.917 0 0.083 0.985 0 0.015 0 0.95 0.05
Penalty 0.987 0 0.013 1 0 0 0 0.929 0.071
Penalty Constraint 0.996 0 0.004 1 0 0 0 0.95 0.05
Constraint 0.992 0 0.008 1 0 0 0 0.942 0.058
Table 4.40: Conclusion Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA2 Syllogism:
Case 3
ment given major premise True and False nodal states are very small. Conclusion
status cannot be False if the major premise is relevant (does not have a N/A nodal
status) and cannot be True if the major premise has a N/A nodal status. This is
due to the AAA2 syllogism structure where the predicate term is the first term of the
major premise and the second term of the conclusion.
Conclusion |Minor = True Conclusion |Minor = False Conclusion |Minor = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0.894 0 0.991 0.009 0 0 0 1
Input Constraint 0.125 0.875 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Input 0.119 0.881 0 0.989 0.011 0 0 0 1
Input Penalty 0.127 0.873 0 0.99 0.01 0 0 0 1
Penalty 0.513 0.487 0 0.75 0.25 0 0 0 1
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0.49 0 0.75 0.25 0 0 0 1
Constraint 0.512 0.488 0 0.667 0.333 0 0 0 1
Table 4.41: Conclusion Given Minor Statement Probabilities for AAA1 and AAA2
Syllogisms: Case 3
Since deduction (AAA1) and abduction (AAA2) have identical minor premises
and conclusions, Table 4.41 shows conclusion statement probabilities given minor
premise for both AAA1 and AAA2. Syllogism structure also requires that conclusion
with nodal status N/A have zero probability given minor premise states of True or
False. AAA1 and AAA2 have the subject term as the first term in both the minor
premise and the conclusion, which manifests as zero probabilities for conclusion nodal
states True and False given minor premise N/A nodal status and a probability of one
for conclusion N/A status given minor premise N/A status. The minor premise
determines the relevance of the conclusion statement for deduction and abduction.
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As expected, there is differentiation along ‘Input’ truncation categories for con-
clusion given minor premise True and False nodal states.
Also present is the previously discussed trend in regards to ‘Constraint’ truncation
category True and False conclusion nodal state given False major premise status
(bolded in Table 4.41).
Conclusion |Minor = True Conclusion |Minor = False Conclusion |Minor = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0.894 0 0 0 1 0.986 0.009 0.005
Input Constraint 0.125 0.875 0 0 0 1 0.995 0 0.005
Input 0.119 0.881 0 0 0 1 0.871 0.01 0.12
Input Penalty 0.127 0.873 0 0 0 1 0.976 0.01 0.015
Penalty 0.513 0.487 0 0 0 1 0.75 0.25 0
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0.49 0 0 0 1 0.75 0.25 0
Constraint 0.512 0.488 0 0 0 1 0.667 0.333 0
Table 4.42: Conclusion Given Minor Statement Probabilities for AAA3 Syllogism:
Case 3
Table 4.42 shows conclusion probabilities given minor premise for induction (AAA3).
Syllogism structure of AAA3 requires that conclusion with nodal status N/A have
zero probability given minor premise status of True. AAA3 has the subject term as
the second term of the minor premise and the first term of the conclusion, which
manifests as zero probabilities for conclusion nodal states True and False given minor
premise False nodal status and a probability of one for conclusion N/A status given
minor premise False status.
As expected, there is a differentiation between truncation categories including
‘Input’ for conclusion given minor status True and N/A.
Also present is the previously discussed trend in regards to ‘Constraint’ truncation
category True and False conclusion nodal state given False major premise status
(bolded).
Flat Mutual Information
Figure 4.5 and Table 4.43 show large flat mutual information values for trunca-
tion categories containing ‘Input’ (between 0.164 and 0.212). For those truncation
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Figure 4.5: Flat Mutual Information: Case 3
AAA1 AAA2 AAA3
Input Constraint 0.166 0.205 0.166
Input Penalty 0.164 0.192 0.164
Penalty Constraint 5E-5 0.012 5E-5
Constraint 1E-4 0.013 1E-4
Input 0.174 0.169 0.174
Penalty 1E-4 0.015 1E-4
Input Penalty Constraint 0.184 0.212 0.184
Table 4.43: Flat Mutual Information Values: Case 3
categories, AAA2 has the largest average values in comparison to AAA1 and AAA3
yet the lowest singular value for ‘Input’. Unlike the additive nature expected of trun-
cation categories, ‘Input’ has the second highest value for AAA1 and AAA3 after
‘Input, Penalty, Constraint’. This deviation may imply that for this case structure
in abductive circumstances, ‘Input’ is relatively more sufficient than other truncation
categories in comparison to other reasoning instances.
Deduction and induction have flat mutual information values of zero for trunca-
tion categories without ‘Input’. Abduction does not as its flat mutual information
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values are between 0.012 and 0.015 for those truncation categories. This implies some
measure of dependence for AAA2 in comparison with the independent premises and
conclusions of AAA1 and AAA3. Realistically, it can be interpreted as lack of ev-
idence for these truncation categories, leaving it unable to be determined sufficient
or not sufficient for decision-making though if no data exists for a circumstance than
that circumstance cannot be sufficient for decision-making as there is simply nothing
there to make a decision from.
It is apparent from the previously discussed probability distributions that trunca-
tion categories containing ‘Input’ are not likely to be sufficient for decision-making.
Due to the magnitude of values for both AAA1/AAA3 and AAA2, truncation cate-
gories including ‘Input’ are inappropriate for sufficient decision-making.
Layered Mutual Information
Figure 4.6: Layered Mutual Information: Case 3
Figure 4.6 and Table 4.44 show layered mutual information values for Case 3.
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AAA1 AAA2 AAA3
Input Constraint 0.202 0.337 0.336
Input Penalty 0.194 0.357 0.357
Penalty Constraint 0.026 0.646 0.646
Constraint 0.033 0.642 0.641
Input 0.212 0.391 0.391
Penalty 0.04 0.631 0.63
Input Penalty Constraint 0.21 0.347 0.347
Table 4.44: Layered Mutual Information Values: Case 3
Similar to Case 2, Case 3 has a trend for truncation categories containing ‘Input’ to
be larger than those not containing ‘Input’. For Case 3, those syllogisms in which
this occurs are AAA2 and AAA3.
This implies a much stronger relationship between premises and conclusions for
truncation categories not containing ‘Input’. Possibly, it is also due to the middle
term ‘useful optimizer’. While large, these values are not as large as those seen in
Case 1 implying that they may be more indicative of sufficient decision-making.
Despite being smaller than those truncation categories not containing ‘Input’,
categories containing ‘Input’ for AAA2 and AAA3 are larger than those for AAA1.
AAA1 values may be too low to for sufficient decision-making. Some concern is had
for categories identified as likely lacking evidence as seen in the small AAA1 and large
AAA3 layered mutual information values
4.4.5 Case 4
To enable the evaluation of generated tool data as design inferences for decision-
making, probability distributions between statements and mutual information of the
associated network for Case 4 are calculated. They are presented here.
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Major = True Major = False Major = N/A
Syllogism: AAA1&AAA3 AAA2 AAA1&AAA3 AAA2 AAA1&AAA3 AAA2
Input Penalty Constraint 0.494 0.494 0.477 0.006 0.029 0.5
Input Constraint 0.496 0.496 0.465 0.004 0.04 0.5
Input 0.442 0.442 0.467 0.058 0.092 0.5
Input Penalty 0.488 0.488 0.475 0.013 0.038 0.5
Penalty 0.494 0.494 0.465 0.006 0.042 0.5
Penalty Constraint 0.498 0.498 0.475 0.002 0.027 0.5
Constraint 0.496 0.496 0.471 0.004 0.033 0.5
Table 4.45: Major Premise Probabilities: Case 4
CPTs
Deduction and induction (AAA1 and AAA3) have the same major premise due
to their syllogism construction: ‘enough solutions are generated from more truncated
optimizers’. The major premise for abduction (AAA2) is ‘a more truncated optimizer
produces enough solutions’.
Table 4.45 does not show differentiation in probabilities on truncation categories
containing ‘Input’, due to the assignment of ‘useful optimizer’ as the subject term
which is not present in the major premise. However, ‘Input’ truncation category’s
probability for all syllogisms when the major premise nodal status is True is 0.442,
which is noticeably lower than other truncation category probabilities for the same
premise status. ‘Input’ truncation category for AAA1 and AAA3 when major premise
nodal status is N/A is 0.092, which is larger than other truncation category proba-
bilities.
Since the predicate term is ‘more truncation’ and determines relevancy for AAA2,
conclusion N/A nodal status probabilities for AAA2 are 0.5 due to the method of
generating evidence (where even amounts of 1, 2, 3, and 4-digit truncation occurred
for all dataset runs).
Deduction and abduction (AAA1 and AAA2) have the same minor premise due
to their syllogism construction: ‘a useful optimizer produces enough solutions’. The
major premise for induction (AAA3) is ‘enough solutions indicate a useful optimizer’.
Table 4.46 shows separation in probabilities values for truncation categories with
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Minor = True Minor = False Minor = N/A
Syllogism: AAA1&AAA2 AAA3 AAA1&AAA2 AAA3 AAA1&AAA2 AAA3
Input Penalty Constraint 0.529 0.529 0.027 0.442 0.444 0.029
Input Constraint 0.531 0.531 0.038 0.429 0.431 0.04
Input 0.525 0.525 0.04 0.383 0.435 0.092
Input Penalty 0.54 0.54 0.031 0.423 0.429 0.038
Penalty 0.95 0.95 0.042 0.008 0.008 0.042
Penalty Constraint 0.965 0.965 0.027 0.008 0.008 0.027
Constraint 0.96 0.96 0.033 0.006 0.006 0.033
Table 4.46: Minor Statement Probabilities: Case 4
and without ‘Input’. When the nodal status of the minor premise is True, the dif-
ferentiation occurs for all three syllogism constructions. When the nodal state of the
major premise is False or N/A, the differentiation only appears according to ‘use-
ful optimizer’ term positioning. For AAA1 and AAA2, ‘useful optimizer’ determines
relevancy as the first term of the minor premise and so differentiation in truncation
category probability is visible for AAA1 and AAA2 when major premise nodal status
is N/A. As the second term for AAA3, it determines if the nodal state is True or
False and can be seen when minor premise nodal status is False.
Minor premise with False nodal status for truncation categories containing ‘Input’
are all greater than 0.38, with the lowest being the truncation category of ‘Input’ at
0.383 (bolded), about 0.04 less than the next lowest truncation category containing
‘Input’.
Conclusion = True Conclusion = False Conclusion = N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.06 0.496 0.444
Input Constraint 0.069 0.5 0.431
Input 0.069 0.496 0.435
Input Penalty 0.075 0.496 0.429
Penalty 0.494 0.498 0.008
Penalty Constraint 0.494 0.498 0.008
Constraint 0.496 0.498 0.006
Table 4.47: Conclusion Statement Probabilities: Case 4
Table 4.47 has the same values for each nodal state for all syllogisms because all
syllogisms in a case have the same conclusion: ‘a useful optimizer can be a more
truncated optimizer’. Since ‘useful optimizer’ is the subject term for Case 4, the
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differentiation based off of truncation categories containing ‘Input’ for the conclusion
statement is for nodal states True and N/A as the subject term determines relevance.
Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.114 0 0.886 0.991 0 0.009 0 0.929 0.071
Input Constraint 0.134 0 0.866 1 0 0 0 0.947 0.053
Input 0.142 0 0.858 0.991 0 0.009 0 0.432 0.568
Input Penalty 0.141 0 0.859 0.991 0 0.009 0 0.833 0.167
Penalty 0.987 0 0.013 0.996 0 0.004 0 1 0
Penalty Constraint 0.987 0 0.013 0.996 0 0.004 0 1 0
Constraint 0.992 0 0.008 0.996 0 0.004 0 1 0
Table 4.48: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA1 Syllogism: Case 4
Table 4.48 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise of
deduction (AAA1). As expected, differentiation on truncation categories containing
‘Input’ occurs for minor premise given major premise nodal states of True and N/A,
and not for False major premise nodal status, the same way that Table 4.45 has
truncation differentiation. This differentiation is much more pronounced for minor
premise given major premise True than for minor premise given major premise N/A.
The probability values of zero for False minor premise given True or False major
premise and True minor premise given N/A major premise are due to the syllogism
structure.
There is a large difference in probability values between ‘Input’ and any other
truncation category for minor premise given major premise nodal status N/A. ‘In-
put’ truncation’s probability value for minor premise False nodal status given major
premise N/A nodal status is 0.432, approximately half the next smallest probability
value for another truncation category. This is an indication that something odd is
happening in regards to ‘Input’ truncation category evidence for major premise nodal
status N/A, likely the same thing as what causes the AAA1 and AAA3 probability
value of 0.092 for major premise N/A nodal status seen in Table 4.45.
Table 4.49 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise for
abduction (AAA2). As expected, differentiation for truncation categories containing
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Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.114 0 0.886 0 0.667 0.333 0.946 0.046 0.008
Input Constraint 0.134 0 0.866 0 0.5 0.5 0.929 0.071 0
Input 0.142 0 0.858 0 0.107 0.893 0.925 0.067 0.008
Input Penalty 0.141 0 0.859 0 0.5 0.5 0.942 0.05 0.008
Penalty 0.987 0 0.013 0 1 0 0.925 0.071 0.004
Penalty Constraint 0.987 0 0.013 0 1 0 0.946 0.05 0.004
Constraint 0.992 0 0.008 0 1 0 0.938 0.058 0.004
Table 4.49: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA2 Syllogism: Case 4
‘Input’ occurs for minor premise given major premise nodal states of True and False.
This differentiation is much more pronounced for minor premise given major premise
True than for minor premise given major premise N/A.
The probability values of zero for False minor premise given True major premise
and True minor premise given False major premise are due to the syllogism structure.
If the major premise has a True nodal status, then the minor premise nodal state must
be either True or N/A (it cannot be False). If the major premise has a False nodal
status, the minor premise nodal state must be False or N/A (it cannot be True). The
structure of the syllogism requires this as AAA2 has the middle term as the second
term in both the minor and major premises.
Minor |Major = True Minor |Major = False Minor |Major = N/A
Minor Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.114 0.886 0 0.991 0.009 0 0 0 1
Input Constraint 0.134 0.866 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Input 0.142 0.858 0 0.991 0.009 0 0 0 1
Input Penalty 0.141 0.859 0 0.991 0.009 0 0 0 1
Penalty 0.987 0.013 0 0.996 0.004 0 0 0 1
Penalty Constraint 0.987 0.013 0 0.996 0.004 0 0 0 1
Constraint 0.992 0.008 0 0.996 0.004 0 0 0 1
Table 4.50: Minor Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA3 Syllogism: Case 4
Table 4.50 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise for
induction (AAA3). As expected, differentiation for truncation categories containing
‘Input’ occurs for minor premise given major premise nodal status of True.
The syllogism structure of induction assigns the middle term as the first term in
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both the minor and major premises, therefore making it so that the minor premise
has a N/A nodal status if and only if the major premise nodal status is N/A.
Conclusion |Major = True Conclusion |Major = False Conclusion |Major = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.114 0 0.886 0 0.991 0.009 0.143 0.786 0.071
Input Constraint 0.134 0 0.866 0 1 0 0.053 0.895 0.053
Input 0.142 0 0.858 0 0.991 0.009 0.068 0.364 0.568
Input Penalty 0.141 0 0.859 0 0.991 0.009 0.167 0.667 0.167
Penalty 0.987 0 0.013 0 0.996 0.004 0.15 0.85 0
Penalty Constraint 0.987 0 0.013 0 0.996 0.004 0.077 0.923 0
Constraint 0.992 0 0.008 0 0.996 0.004 0.125 0.875 0
Table 4.51: Conclusion Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA1 and AAA3
Syllogisms: Case 4
Deduction (AAA1) and induction (AAA3) have identical major premises and con-
clusions, thus Table 4.51 presents probabilities for conclusion statements given major
premise for both AAA1 and AAA3. Syllogism structure requires that conclusion
statements with nodal status False have zero probability given major premise status
of True. Conclusion statements with True nodal status for major premise False nodal
status also have zero probability.
The bolded values in Table 4.51 are interesting. ‘Input’ has a much smaller False
conclusion statement nodal state probability given N/A major premise nodal sta-
tus, and also a corresponding relatively large N/A conclusion statement nodal state
probability given N/A major premise nodal status when compared to other trunca-
tion categories including ‘Input’. For truncation categories without ‘Input’, when the
conclusion statement nodal status is N/A given a N/A major premise nodal status,
the probability is zero. Truncation categories containing ‘Input’ for the same circum-
stances have small probabilities, which implies some not yet understood effect such
as lack of evidence.
Table 4.52 shows the probabilities of the minor premise given the major premise
for induction (AAA3). As expected, differentiation for truncation categories with and
without ‘Input’ occurs for minor premise given major premise nodal states of True
and False.
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Conclusion |Major = True Conclusion |Major = False Conclusion |Major = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.114 0 0.886 0.667 0 0.333 0 0.992 0.008
Input Constraint 0.134 0 0.866 0.5 0 0.5 0 1 0
Input 0.142 0 0.858 0.107 0 0.893 0 0.992 0.008
Input Penalty 0.141 0 0.859 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.992 0.008
Penalty 0.987 0 0.013 1 0 0 0 0.996 0.004
Penalty Constraint 0.987 0 0.013 1 0 0 0 0.996 0.004
Constraint 0.992 0 0.008 1 0 0 0 0.996 0.004
Table 4.52: Conclusion Given Major Statement Probabilities for AAA2 Syllogism:
Case 4
The syllogism structure of induction has the middle term as the first term in both
the minor and major premises, therefore making it so that the minor premise has a
N/A nodal status if and only if the major premise nodal status is N/A.
‘Input’ truncation category has a much smaller True conclusion statement nodal
state probability given False major premise nodal status, and also a corresponding
relatively large N/A conclusion statement nodal state probability given False major
premise nodal status when compared to all other truncation categories, most notably
the other categories that contain ‘Input’. For truncations without ‘Input’, when the
conclusion statement nodal status is True or N/A given a False major premise nodal
status, the probability is one or zero respectively. This is in contrast with trunca-
tion categories containing ‘Input’ for the same circumstances that have approximate
probability values of 0.5.
Conclusion |Minor = True Conclusion |Minor = False Conclusion |Minor = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0.894 0 0.154 0.846 0 0 0 1
Input Constraint 0.125 0.875 0 0.056 0.944 0 0 0 1
Input 0.119 0.881 0 0.158 0.842 0 0 0 1
Input Penalty 0.127 0.873 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 1
Penalty 0.513 0.487 0 0.15 0.85 0 0 0 1
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0.49 0 0.077 0.923 0 0 0 1
Constraint 0.512 0.488 0 0.125 0.875 0 0 0 1
Table 4.53: Conclusion Given Minor Statement Probabilities for AAA1 and AAA2
Syllogisms: Case 4
Since deduction (AAA1) and abduction (AAA2) have identical minor premises
and conclusions, Table 4.53 shows conclusion probabilities given minor premise for
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both AAA1 and AAA2. Syllogism structure also requires that conclusion with nodal
status N/A have zero probability given minor premise states of True or False. AAA1
and AAA2 have the subject term as the first term in both the minor premise and the
conclusion, which manifests as zero probabilities for conclusion nodal states True and
False given minor premise N/A nodal status and a probability of one for conclusion
N/A status given minor premise N/A status. The minor premise determines the
relevance of the conclusion statement for deduction and abduction.
As expected, there is differentiation between truncation categories containing ‘In-
put’ and those not for conclusion statements given a True minor premise nodal status.
Conclusion |Minor = True Conclusion |Minor = False Conclusion |Minor = N/A
Conclusion Status: True False N/A True False N/A True False N/A
Input Penalty Constraint 0.106 0.894 0 0 0 1 0.143 0.786 0.071
Input Constraint 0.125 0.875 0 0 0 1 0.053 0.895 0.053
Input 0.119 0.881 0 0 0 1 0.068 0.364 0.568
Input Penalty 0.127 0.873 0 0 0 1 0.167 0.667 0.167
Penalty 0.513 0.487 0 0 0 1 0.15 0.85 0
Penalty Constraint 0.51 0.49 0 0 0 1 0.077 0.923 0
Constraint 0.512 0.488 0 0 0 1 0.125 0.875 0
Table 4.54: Conclusion Given Minor Statement Probabilities for AAA3 Syllogism:
Case 4
Table 4.54 shows probability values for conclusion statements given minor premise
for induction (AAA3). Syllogism structure of AAA3 requires that conclusion with
nodal status N/A has zero probability given minor premise status of True. AAA3 has
the subject term as the second term of the minor premise and the first term of the
conclusion, which manifests as zero probability for conclusion nodal states True and
False given minor premise False nodal status and a probability of one for conclusion
N/A status given minor premise False status.
As expected, there is a difference between values for truncation categories with
and without ‘Input’ for conclusion statements given minor status True.
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Figure 4.7: Flat Mutual Information: Case 4
AAA1 AAA2 AAA3
Input Constraint 0.166 -0.096 0.166
Input Penalty 0.164 -0.096 0.164
Penalty Constraint 0 0.006 0
Constraint 0 0.006 0
Input 0.174 -0.097 0.174
Penalty 0 0.005 0
Input Penalty Constraint 0.184 -0.088 0.184
Table 4.55: Flat Mutual Information Values: Case 4
Flat Mutual Information
Figure 4.7 and Table 4.55 present flat mutual information values for Case 4. There
is a clear distinction between truncation categories with and without ‘Input’. AAA1
and AAA3 have values between 0.164 and 0.184 for truncation categories containing
Input. AAA2 has values between -0.088 and -0.097 for the same categories.
Abduction having negative values does not indicate a lack of sufficiency to make
decisions. Abduction, in comparison to deduction and induction, possesses a less
rigorous structure connecting statements. Abduction articulates an insight or hunch
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that can derive from statements with weaker relationships. It is possible that the
negative value indicates an emergent relationship between premises and conclusions
rather than an increase in uncertainty.
Truncation categories not containing ‘Input’ are non-zero only for AAA2, where
they range in mutual information values between 0.005 and 0.006. This implies a
slight measure of dependence for AAA2 in comparison with the independent premises
and conclusions of AAA1 and AAA3. Realistically, it can be interpreted as lack of
evidence for these truncation categories, leaving it unable to be determined sufficient
or not sufficient for decision-making. This lack of evidence is similar to Case 3.
The overall shape and trends of Figure 4.7 is reminiscent of Case 1. Both Case 4
and Case 1 possess ‘enough solutions’ as a middle term. This exemplifies the middle
term’s ability to connect the premises and thus provide a foundation upon which the
conclusion is based.
Layered Mutual Information
Figure 4.8: Layered Mutual Information: Case 4
111
AAA1 AAA2 AAA3
Input Constraint 0.3 1.118 1.289
Input Penalty 0.303 1.096 1.259
Penalty Constraint 0.008 0.672 0.672
Constraint 0.006 0.668 0.668
Input 0.3 1.126 1.279
Penalty 0.008 0.662 0.662
Input Penalty Constraint 0.31 1.173 1.359
Table 4.56: Layered Mutual Information Values: Case 4
Figure 4.8 and Table 4.56 present the layered mutual information values for Case
4. All three syllogisms show distinct differences in values for truncation categories
with and without ‘Input’. Truncation categories without ‘Input’ are very small (0.006
to 0.008) for AAA1 and much larger for AAA2 and AAA3 (0.662 to 0.672)
The rigidity of deductive syllogism constructions and the near-zero layered mutual
information values indicate a lack of sufficiency for decision-making. Abduction and
induction truncation categories have larger values and thus suggest sufficiency.
4.5 Sufficiency
To evaluate tool appropriateness, conclusion sufficiency for decision-making must
first be discussed.
Probability values for all cases show that premise definitions strongly impact the
correlation of conclusion values to major and minor premises. Low values, those close
to zero, indicate a need to moderately revise definitions for the cases presented in
order to ensue there is more data to draw conclusions from. Case 1 and Case 2
both strongly correlate the cognizance of a True minor premise to a True conclusion
for truncation categories not containing ‘Input’. Case 3 and Case 4 both strongly
correlate the cognizance of a True major premise to a True conclusion for truncation
categories not containing ‘Input’. For all cases, truncation categories with ‘Input’ do
not stand out.
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Flat mutual information values can be separated into three groups across cases.
The structure of the flat network used to calculate these values predicates certain syl-
logisms with specific statements to have identical trends. This is because flat mutual
information does not differentiate between premises and conclusions and so lacks the
ordering implications that are indicative of design decisions. Each flat mutual infor-
mation value is essentially predicated on the repeated second term of the statements
though still allowing for insights into the impact of terms within premises. Recall that
Case 1 and Case 2 have the same subject term: ‘more truncation’. Case 1 abductive
syllogism, Case 2 deductive and inductive syllogisms, and Case 4 abductive syllogisms
have identical flat mutual information values where truncation categories with ‘Input’
are negative and truncation categories without ‘Input’ are positive and small. These
identical values are because of the term ‘enough solutions’, which especially requires
a revised definition.
Case 3 deductive and inductive syllogisms and Case 4 deductive and inductive
syllogisms have identical flat mutual information trend values as well. Truncation
categories without ‘Input’ have zero mutual information, in this case an indication
of lack of evidence and not independence. This is because of the term definitions
of the first terms in the statement pair that predicates flat mutual information for
these situations: ‘enough solutions’ and ‘useful optimizer’. Case 1 deductive and
inductive syllogisms, Case 2 abductive syllogism, and Case 3 abductive syllogisms
have the largest flat mutual information values despite separation between truncation
categories that contain ‘Input’ and those that do not, due to the relative irrelevance
of ‘enough solutions’ not being a predicating term.
Due to the limitations of the flat representation, a layered representation was
created. Mutual information from the layered network is calculated and utilized to
contextually examine premises and conclusion relationships. A clear preference of
deduction for decision-making is seen when all case syllogisms are compared. Case
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1 is the most sufficient for decision-making, in part due to the sensible semantic
implications in comparison to other cases. Assignment of terms for Case 1 indicated
that the primary concern, ‘truncation’, should be the subject. The middle term
should be defined such that there is appropriate amounts of evidence to connect the
premises and conclusion statements. Thus, Case 1 shows an inclination for truncation
categories not including ‘Input’ to be sufficient for decision-making, specifically in a
deductive reasoning instance. More investigation is required to increase confidence to
be sure that data generated and constructed using deductive inferences of Case 1 is
suitable for knowledge queries.
Case 2 is not sufficient for decision-making. Negative layered mutual informa-
tion values raise serious concerns about Case 2’s term assignment. Case 2 lacks
the necessary relationships between premises and statements needed in reasoning in-
stances, likely due to the positioning of ‘enough solutions’ as the predicate term which
precludes a strong connection between premises. In order to continue investigating
sufficient decision-making, additional case constructions must be examined.
Case 3 is more suitable than Case 2. However, the startling flip of values of trun-
cation categories containing ‘Input’ and those not containing ‘Input’ does not match
what the dataset validation suggests: that datasets for truncations containing ‘In-
put’ are not sufficient for decision-making. It seems likely that due to the conclusion
statement “enough solutions are generated from more truncated optimizers”, Case
3 is borderline for strong enough inferences for sufficient decision-making in induc-
tive reasoning instances but lacks the strength of correlation needed for deductive
reasoning instances.
Case 4 has too large layered mutual information values to draw sufficient con-
clusions from inductive or abductive syllogisms and too small values for deductive
syllogisms. The connection between premises allows for more suitable decisions to be
made.
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Of the cases considered, overall deductive syllogisms are the best chance for suffi-
ciency. Deduction is a more rigorously structured syllogism than induction or abduc-
tion, and that is why in circumstances with such related terms as the ones expressed
in these cases it is the closest to sufficiency. In order to make decisions from this
tool, revised terms should be constructed from the designer’s new hunch to alter the
hypothesis for further investigation.
Compared premises suggest the importance of the middle term in establishing
context between the major and minor premises. Without relevant data connecting
the foundations of a conclusion, it is exceedingly difficult to generate inferences useful
for decision-making. Designer construction and ordering of statements in syllogisms
matter in addition to designer-defined terms.
4.6 Conclusions
Evaluating tool appropriateness requires understanding of conclusion sufficiency.
Designer perspective is encoded within every step of design, and this is evident within
this framework as the declaration and definition of terms.
Often, the designer can only identify something as not sufficient, and continue
from there. Such is the situation with these cases where truncation categories that
include ‘Input’ are not sufficient for decision-making. These truncation categories
have been evaluated to find the tool not appropriate when truncated in such a way.
This aligns with understanding that the consequences of truncating ‘Input’ are greater
than that of ‘Penalty’ or ‘Constraint’ because of the compounding and progression of
error. ‘Input’ values are the baseline of all optimizer calculations while ‘Penalty’ and
‘Constraint’ are more meta-evaluative as they compute a measure of unfitness and
weigh the fitness score, so truncation of those categories do not have the same long
reaching effect
This case study demonstrated the value of the framework proposed in Chapter
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III. Syllogisms with different term assignments were evaluated for sufficiency. Proba-
bility, flat mutual information, and layered mutual information values were evaluated
as quantifiable multi-level measures for making sufficient decisions. Subject, pred-
icate, and middle terms were compared for impact within statements. Statement






This dissertation has presented a unique framework to answer the question, “how
can designers determine the sufficiency or quality of a design decision knowledge query
based upon design tool-generated data?”
The novel contributions of this research include:
• Realization that sufficiency is not just statistical success or an artifact of the tool
(such as convergence statistics or Pareto optimality) but rather based upon ac-
tual and true logic theory grounded comparative evaluations associated with de-
signer decision-making knowledge query utilizing available tool-generated data.
• Developed the novel ability to comparatively evaluate derived design data uti-
lizing distinct syllogism constructs.
• Created a mechanism to model various decision-making knowledge queries in
terms of deduction, abduction, and induction. These logical reasoning instances
are described in logical syllogistic forms as AAA1, AAA2, and AAA3 respec-
tively. A novel contribution of this thesis is to be able to evaluate each distinctly
in context of the logical inference unique to that reasoning instance.
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– This methodology is the first in the marine domain and to the best of the
author’s knowledge, the first in the engineering design domain to do so.
• Identified required syllogistic factors of the major premise, minor premise, and
conclusion statements to extend to multi-level representation.
• Development of multi-level network (flat and layered) of deductive (AAA1), ab-
ductive (AAA2), and inductive (AAA3) syllogisms, including the mechanisms
for combining major and minor premises as compound constructions for layered
networks, in order to evaluate both isolated and combined premise and conclu-
sion relationships, enabling differentiation between major and minor premise
contributions to conclusion statements.
• Developed unique metrics for enabling the evaluation of sufficiency with the
application of probability and mutual information from information theory.
• Recognition of the need for probability statistics to evaluate sufficiency asso-
ciated with logical syllogisms. A unique Bayesian framework was created to
determine the probabilistic associations within and between the major, minor,
and conclusion statements to evaluate sufficiency judgements based upon the
ensemble design data.
– Uniquely generate the probabilities necessary for eventual multi-level eval-
uation for sufficiency determination.
– Determination of proper ordering of statements relative to context depen-
dent on the conclusion to determine relevancy of associated tool-generated
data.
– Evaluation of sequence of premise statements to determine required direc-
tionality of statements for conclusion.
• Developed four instances of a primary case study that:
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– Validated and verified the framework.
– Demonstrated the use of the flat and layered network representations in
order to quantify the separate and combined impact of major and minor
premises on conclusion constructions and thus interpretation of tool data
suitability.
– Demonstrated the need for layered networks to quantify the separate and
combined impact of major and minor premises on conclusion constructions
and thus interpretation of tool data suitability.
– Demonstrated the impact of ordering of major, minor and conclusion state-
ments in terms of syllogistic sufficiency.
– Demonstrated the distinction between deduction, induction, and abduc-
tion as knowledge queries.
5.2 Future Topics of Interest
The focus of this dissertation was to assist in designer determination of the suffi-
ciency of a design decision based upon design tool-generated data. With the comple-
tion of this work there are several future topics that are worth investigating. These
future topics include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Modification of network states from pseudo-Boolean logic to a multi-state envi-
ronment. Network states presented in this work were used to calculate the met-
rics for evaluation of tool use suitability. These states consisted of True, False,
and N/A. While the addition of N/A allowed for discernment of non-relevant
data and provided proof of concept for the framework, further sophistication
could lead to more nuanced transformations of semantic language to quantified
statements. Fuzzy logic may be one way in which to do this.
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• Extension to other syllogism forms beyond AAA1, AAA2, and AAA3.
– Syllogisms with figure four structures are cyclical and thus unable to be
represented as a Bayesian network without some sort of term transforma-
tion. AAA4 specifically is another form of abduction that may provide
additional insights as the relationships between statements are differently
correlated than the AAA1, AAA2, and AAA3 syllogisms examined in this
work.
– Additionally, this work only evaluated syllogisms without negatory premises
or conclusions. It can be useful in design to determine when tool data is
suitable to draw conclusions about the lack of something. Syllogism mood
types E or O can be investigated for these purposes.
– Comparison of individual syllogisms with premise moods of differing strength
of conviction. For example, syllogisms of structures AII and IAI under
the current framework would result in the same evaluation. Adjustment of
semantic transformations to differentiate ‘some’ and ‘all’ as language mod-
ifiers could provide additional granularity in designer intent and suitable
use of tool-generated data.
• Application of the framework to larger, more complex decisions. The layered
network methodology provides the basic technique to combine multiple state-
ments. Additional tiers for this would allow more sophisticated insights on
ordering implications for decision-making.
• Inclusion of other network metrics to evaluate more nuanced insights of de-
cisions. This work currently uses probability distributions and mutual infor-
mation. With more complex combinations of premises, additional statistical
analyses or metrics could quantify and isolate impacts of specific statement
contributions to decision-making. Additionally, with increased combinations
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of statements, concepts such as Markov Blankets may be useful to isolate the
impact of grouped statements to decision-making, or as contributions to a sub-
decision.
• Articulation and development of additional methods to quantify the impact of





Bulk Carrier Synthesis Model
This appendix provides an overview of the bulk carrier synthesis model developed
by Sen and Yang (1998). Additional information may also be found in Yang et al.
(1990) and Yang and Sen (1996).
Inputs and Intermediate Functions
The model defines six inputs: length (L), beam (B), draft (T ), depth (D), speed
(V ), and block coefficient (CB). These inputs can be expressed by the input vector
x = [L,B, T,D, V, CB]. Using these inputs, the model defines a host of intermediate
functions:
annual cost = capital charges + running cost
+ voyage cost + RTPA (A.1)
capital charges = 0.2× ship cost (A.2)
ship cost = 1.3× (steel mass)0.85
+ 3500× outfit mass + 2400× P 0.8 (A.3)
steel mass = 0.034× L1.7 ×B0.7 ×D0.4 × C0.5B (A.4)
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outfit mass = L0.8 ×B0.6 ×D0.3 × C0.1B (A.5)
machinery mass = 0.17× P 0.9 (A.6)
P = ∆2/3 × V 3 × 1
b(cB)× V(g×L)0.5 + a (CB)
(A.7)
∆ = 1.025× L×B × T × CB (A.8)
running cost = 40000×DW 0.3 (A.9)
DW = ∆− light ship mass (A.10)
voyage cost = fuel cost + port cost (A.11)
fuel cost = 1.05× daily consumption× sea days× fuel price (A.12)





round trip miles = 5000 (nautical miles) (A.15)
fuel price = 100 (pounds/ton) (A.16)
port cost = 6.3×DW 0.8 (A.17)
RTPA =
350
sea days + port days
(A.18)







cargo deadweight = DW − fuel carried− crew, stores, and water (A.20)
fuel carried = daily consumption× (sea days + 5) (A.21)
crew, stores, and water = 2.0×DW 0.5 (A.22)
cargo handling rate = 8000 (tons/day) (A.23)
where RTPA is round trips per annum, DW is deadweight, and g is the gravitational
constant (g = 9.8065 m/s2). The functions a(CB) and b(CB) are regression equations
based on Froude Number and a coefficient referred to as the Admiralty Coefficient,
detailed in the original paper.
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Objectives
The model defines three objectives:
Ω1 = min(transportation cost) (A.24)
Ω2 = min(light ship mass) (A.25)
Ω3 = max(annual cargo) (A.26)
which can be expressed by the objective vector Ω = [Ω1,Ω2,Ω3]. The functions that






light ship mass = steel mass + outfit mass + machinery mass (A.28)
annual cargo = cargo deadweight× RTPA (A.29)
Constraints
The model defines dimensional and displacement constraints:
L/B ≥ 6 (A.30)
L/D ≤ 15 (A.31)
L/T ≤ 19 (A.32)
T ≤ 0.45×DW 0.31 (A.33)
T ≤ 0.7×D + 0.7 (A.34)
DW ≥ 3000 (A.35)
DW ≤ 500000 (A.36)
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powering constraints:
CB ≥ 0.63 (A.37)
CB ≤ 0.75 (A.38)
V ≥ 14 (A.39)




and a stability constraint:
GM ≥ 0.07×B (A.42)
where
GM = KB + BM −KG (A.43)
KB = 0.53× T (A.44)
BM =
(0.085× CB − 0.002)×B2
T × CB
(A.45)
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